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TRUE TO CHARACTER: HONORING THE INTELLECTUAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CHARACTER EVIDENCE RULE IN 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROSECUTIONS 
ANDREW KING-RIES* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The law has condoned domestic violence1 in America since the formation 
of the country.  Two hundred and thirty years of the American experiment 
have witnessed three different phases of the legal system’s condoning of 
domestic violence.  During the early years of the United States, the common 
law expressly permitted violence against women.2  This prerogative ended 
around the middle of the nineteenth century when states rejected the rule of 
 
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Montana University School of Law; B.A. in History 1988, 
Brown University; J.D. 1993, Washington University in St. Louis.  I am indebted to my 
colleagues, Tom Huff, Bari Burke, and J. Martin Burke for their invaluable assistance and 
insightful comments.  I also want to thank Melissa Hartigan and Monte Jewell for compelling 
conversation and assistance.  My thanks also to Wayne Capp, who did wonderful work as my 
research assistant.  For Kristin King-Ries, I am so grateful for her constant support, enthusiasm, 
and assistance.  Lastly, I am forever indebted to the domestic violence victims who shared their 
stories with me in my eight years with the King County Prosecutors Office. 
 1. Throughout this article, I refer to violence between intimate partners as domestic 
violence.  For an interesting discussion of alternative terminology, see CLARE DALTON & 
ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW 3 (2001).  By “domestic 
violence,” I intend a pattern of violence by one partner for the purpose of exerting power and 
control over the other.  See infra text accompanying notes 65-116 for more complete discussion.  
The establishment of such a pattern of violent behavior creates a “battering relationship.”  
Importantly, not all violence within an intimate relationship establishes a battering relationship.  
For the purposes of this paper, I am concerned about the admissibility of character evidence of a 
battering relationship, not simply violence within an intimate relationship.  Although there are 
interesting parallels, for the purposes of this paper, I am excluding child abuse. 
 2. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self 
Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623, 627-30 (1980) [hereinafter Schneider, Equal Rights].  
While batterers are overwhelmingly heterosexual males, battering relationships are not limited to 
heterosexuals.  I specifically use the gender-neutral terms “domestic violence” and “battering 
relationship” to recognize that violence and battering occurs within homosexual relationships and 
can be perpetrated on males.  That said, however, because statistics demonstrate that nearly 95% 
of domestic violence victims are women, I will also employ gender-specific language throughout 
this paper.  See infra note 129.  While the day may come when domestic violence will be less 
strongly related to gender, now is not that day. 
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chastisement.3  Interestingly, legal prohibition has not impacted the prevalence 
of domestic violence.  Domestic violence remains the leading cause of injury 
to women every year.4  This fact stems from the two more subtle periods of 
legal sanction of domestic violence.  From the 1850s until the 1970s, the law 
reinforced a public-private dichotomy, assigned violence against women to the 
private sphere, and then refused to intervene in the private sphere.5  This phase 
of tacit sanction of domestic violence through non-intervention into the private 
realm lessened after the 1970s due to the impact of public recognition.6  This 
impact, however, has been significantly negated by the operation of the 
character evidence ban.  The character evidence ban has taken the place of the 
rule of chastisement and non-intervention into the private sphere to perpetuate 
the legal sanction of domestic violence. 
In general, the character evidence ban precludes the admission of evidence 
of the defendant’s prior bad acts; its purpose is to isolate the charged incident 
from the defendant’s past so the jury can assess the validity of the charged 
incident unencumbered by other behavior.  Domestic violence, by its very 
nature, is not an isolated incident, but rather a pattern of behavior designed to 
exert power and control over another person.7  Inherent in domestic violence is 
repetitive conduct.8  Given the repetitive nature of battering relationships, the 
 
 3. See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text. 
 4. Benjamin Z. Rice, A Voice from People v. Simpson: Reconsidering the Propensity Rule 
in Spousal Homicide Cases, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 939, 939-40 (1996).  “Violence is now leading 
cause of injuries to women ages 15 through 44 years.”  Id. (citing Antonio C. Novello, From the 
Surgeon General, U.S. Public Health Service: A Medical Response to Domestic Violence, 267 
JAMA 3132, 3132 (1992)). 
 5. Katherine Schelong, Domestic Violence and the State: Responses to and Rationales for 
Spousal Battering, Marital Rape, and Stalking, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 79, 91-92, 94 (1994). 
 6. See id. at 94-96, 102-07. 
 7. Debra Raye Hayes Ogden, Prosecuting Domestic Violence Crimes: Effectively Using 
Rule 404(b) to Hold Batterers Accountable for Repeated Abuse, 34 GONZ. L. REV. 361, 362 
(1998/99).  “Domestic violence is not an isolated event.  One battering episode builds on past 
episodes and sets the stage for future episodes . . . .  The incidents have one thing in common: the 
abuse is directed at controlling the intimate partner.”  Id.  See infra notes 84-95 and 
accompanying text. 
 8. Myrna S. Raeder, The Admissibility of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence: Simpson and 
Beyond, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1463, 1468 (1996) (discussing studies indicating that 90% of women 
murdered by their batterers had previously called the police).  See also Robert A. Guy, Jr., The 
Nature and Constitutionality of Stalking Laws, 46 VAND. L. REV. 991, 996 (1993).  Additionally, 
studies have also found that 50% of murdered domestic violence victims had called police five or 
more times prior to their deaths.  Raeder, supra, at 1468 n.22.  Finally, a 1991 study found that 
“about one in five women victimized by a husband or former husband reported that they had been 
the victim of a series of similar crimes, with at least three assaults in the last six months, so 
similar that they could not remember them distinctly.”  Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the Gap 
Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice for Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 359, 389 (1996). 
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ban on prior bad act evidence is at issue in nearly every domestic violence 
prosecution.  Because nearly four million American women are battered every 
year,9 the effect of the character evidence ban in the domestic violence context 
is significant.  No other evidence rule goes to the heart of a crime the way that 
the character evidence ban does with domestic violence.  The character 
evidence ban prevents the true nature of domestic violence from exposure to 
public scrutiny and, therefore, sanctions and perpetuates domestic violence. 
This article calls for a new rule allowing the admission of prior acts of 
abuse within the context of a current domestic violence prosecution.  Articles 
dealing with domestic violence that advocate a change in the law typically 
begin with a horrible fact pattern.10  Indeed, the use of such undeniably 
horrible stories reveals the emotional power of domestic violence and often 
compels the reader toward a particular viewpoint.  Generally, such narratives 
are followed by arguments which flow as follows: domestic violence is a 
societal epidemic; domestic violence prosecutions are difficult; the particular 
rule change will make it easier to prosecute domestic violence perpetrators; 
more successful prosecution will reduce the societal epidemic of domestic 
violence; therefore, the law should be changed.11 
 
 9. Joan Zorza, Women Battering: High Costs and the State of the Law, in  NANCY K.D. 
LEMON, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW 11, 15 (2001).  Statistics on the number of women who 
experience domestic violence range widely, mainly due to differences in methodology.  In 2000, 
the National Institute of Justice estimated that 1.3 million women are victimized every year by 
intimate partners.  PATRICIA TJADEN AND NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REP. NCJ-
183781, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, & CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 26 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/183781.pdf.  This 
study was limited to women over the age of 18 who lived in a house with a telephone.  The study, 
therefore, excludes juveniles, homeless women, and women isolated by poverty or the batterer’s 
design.  Albert Roberts, Spousal and Partner Abuse, in VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: AN 
ENCYCLOPEDIA 207, 209 (Ronald Gottesman & Richard Maxwell Brown, eds., 1999).  It has 
been estimated that a man beats a woman every twelve seconds in the United States, and thirty to 
fifty percent of the women murdered in the United States die at the hands of the intimate male 
partners.  Rice, supra note 4, at 940; see also Susan E. Bernstein, Living Under Seige: Do 
Stalking Laws Protect Domestic Violence Victims?, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 525, 525 (1993); 
LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD ET. AL., U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, REP. NCJ-167237, VIOLENCE BY 
INTIMATES: ANALYSIS OF DATA ON CRIMES BY CURRENT OR FORMER SPOUSES, BOYFRIENDS, 
AND GIRLFRIENDS 5 (1998), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/vi.pdf.  For an 
interesting discussion about analyzing domestic violence data, see UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 7-48 (Nancy A. Cromwell & Ann W. Burgess eds., 1996). 
 10. See De Sanctis, supra note 8, at 363-65; Sarah J. Lee, The Search for the Truth: 
Admitting Evidence of Prior Abuse in Cases of Domestic Violence, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 221, 221-
22 (1998); Linell A. Letendre, Beating Again and Again and Again: Why Washington Needs a 
New Rule of Evidence Admitting Prior Acts of Domestic Violence, 75 WASH. L. REV. 973, 973 
(2000). 
 11. See Lee, supra note 10, at 253-59.  See also De Sanctis, supra note 8, at 397-400; 
Letendre, supra note 10, at 996-1003. 
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This article, by contrast, seeks to ground the need to change the character 
evidence ban for domestic violence prosecutions in reasons that have nothing 
to do with making the prosecution easier.  Historically, changes that make 
prosecution of particular types of cases easier are morally suspect and tend to 
reflect the will of powerful majorities as opposed to proper advances in the 
law.  The difficulty lies in the fact that rules, protections, and civil liberties are 
jettisoned in order to combat a specific evil, yet the reasons for that tactic are 
not connected to the traditional rationale supporting the rules, protections, and 
civil liberties.12 
This article proposes a specific evidence rule in the domestic violence 
context which would admit evidence of the defendant’s character as it relates 
to battering and would allow that evidence to be used substantively in a 
prosecution for domestic violence.  The argument here grounds the need for a 
new rule regarding admissibility of prior bad acts in domestic violence cases in 
the very rationale which supports the general ban on character evidence.  It is 
the position of this paper that the rationale supporting the current rule actually 
calls for a rule change in the domestic violence context and supports such a 
change, thereby preserving the ideals behind the original rule. 
This article will proceed in the following fashion.  Section II will discuss 
the history of domestic violence in America.  That section will explore the 
three ways that the law has condoned domestic violence: express sanction 
through the rule of chastisement, tacit sanction through non-intervention in the 
private sphere, and implicit sanction through the effect of the character 
evidence rule.  Section III will examine the intellectual background of the 
character evidence ban.  Specifically, that section will identify how the 
character evidence ban embodies major developments in intellectual history 
prior to, and during, the creation of the American Republic: the rejection of 
virtue ethics, the Reformation, the development of the liberal state, the rise of 
modern science, the Enlightenment, and the breakdown of social stratification.  
Section III will then explore the conflict between the character evidence rule 
and the law’s recognition of domestic violence.  In addition, Section III will 
demonstrate how the character evidence ban violates its underlying principles 
in the domestic violence context.  That section will also articulate rationale for 
a new character evidence rule in the domestic violence context – a rule 
consistent with the rule’s original intellectual underpinnings. 
 
 12. Unfortunately, this phenomenon can be seen clearly in the government’s response to 
terrorism. 
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II.  THE HISTORY OF LEGAL SANCTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
A. The Rule of Chastisement 
American common law largely derived from English law, which fully 
recognized the right of men to engage in violence against their wives.13  Ten 
years prior to the American Revolution, William Blackstone published his 
Commentaries on the Laws of England.14  This work had significant impact on 
the development of American laws relating to domestic violence.15  Blackstone 
articulated the common law rule which authorized a husband to beat his wife 
with either “moderate chastisement” or “severely with scourges and 
cudgels.”16 
According to Blackstone, the rule of chastisement stemmed directly from 
the inferior legal status of women upon marriage.17  Under English and 
American common law, married women had no legal status.18  The complete 
legal subjugation of women was primarily accomplished through two 
doctrines: coverture and unities.19  According to the doctrine of coverture, the 
wife was under the protection, or cover, of the husband.20  The second and 
related doctrine was the theory of unities.21  According to Blackstone, “By 
marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or 
legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is 
incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband.”22  Married women 
could not own real or personal property, enter into a contract, sue or be sued, 
 
 13. Virginia H. Murray, A Comparative Study of the Historic Civil, Common, and American 
Indian Tribal Law Responses to Domestic Violence, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 433, 442 (1998); 
Schelong, supra note 5, at 90.  Schelong identifies that the roots of state sanctioned domestic 
violence can be traced back to Roman law.  Roman law allowed men to beat their wives, even to 
death, for offenses that impugned their honor or property.  Id. at 84.  See also Rice, supra note 4, 
at 940; Schneider, Equal Rights, supra note 2, at 627-30. 
 14. Dennis Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New American Republic, 51 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 731, 735 (1976). 
 15. Murray, supra note 13, at 442; Reva B. Siegel, The Rule of Love: Wife Beating as 
Prerogative, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2124 n.21 (1996) (discussing the importance and the impact of 
Blackstone’s commentaries on American law, lawyers, and development of domestic violence 
law).  For a general discussion of Blackstone’s influence on American law, see Nolan, supra note 
14. 
 16. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *444-45. 
 17. Schelong, supra note 5, at 86-87. 
 18. Clare Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and Divorce: Constraints and 
Possibilities, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 321, 326 (1997).  See also Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort 
Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. REV. 359, 361-65 (1989). 
 19. NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 7 (2000). 
 20. Dalton, supra note 18, at 326. 
 21. Id. 
 22. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *442. 
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make a will, deny a husband’s sexual advances, or testify in a court of law, 
especially against her husband.23 
According to Blackstone, the husband’s right to beat his wife was the 
result of women having no legal identity upon marriage: 
For, as he is to answer for her misbehavior, the law thought it reasonable to 
intrust him with this power of restraining her, by domestic chastisement, in the 
same moderation that a man is allowed to correct his apprentices or 
children . . . .24 
The right of correction granted the husband, and father, the right to use 
physical violence, including a rod or whip, against his wife, children, servants, 
and apprentices.25  Prior to being imported into the United States, the English 
right to chastisement had two limitations.  First, the husband could not inflict 
death or serious permanent disfigurement.26  Second, the rule of thumb limited 
the size of the stick with which the husband could beat his wife to one smaller 
than the width of his thumb.27  Importantly, the right of correction, although 
intellectually separate from abuse, justified nearly all forms of assault by 
parents and husbands so long as it did not cause permanent injury.28 
The right to chastise a wife became part of the American common law 
during the colonial period and continued in many states well past the Civil 
War.  As early as 1681, courts throughout the country expressly acknowledged 
the existence of the English rule of chastisement.29  Importantly, in each case, 
 
 23. Schelong, supra note 5, at 86.  See Malinda L. Seymore, Isn’t it a Crime: Feminist 
Perspectives on Spousal Immunity and Spousal Violence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1032, 1047-52 
(1996) (discussing origins of spousal immunity); Siegel, supra note 15, at 2153 n.132. 
 24. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *444.  See also Dalton, supra note 18, at 326.  
According to some commentators, the right of chastisement or “correction” that Blackstone 
acknowledged originally derived from the Christian church in the 14th Century Rules of 
Marriage: 
When you see your wife commit an offense, don’t rush at her with insults and violent 
blows . . . .  Scold her sharply, bully and terrify her.  And if this still doesn’t work . . . take 
up a stick and beat her soundly, for it is better to punish the body and correct the soul than 
to damage the soul and spare the body . . . .  Then readily beat her, not in rage but out of 
charity and concern for her soul, so that the beating will redound to your merit and her 
good. 
Schelong, supra note 5, at 85; see also Melanie Frager Griffith, Battered Woman Syndrome: A 
Tool for Batterers?, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 141, 153 n.69 (1995). 
 25. ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 
AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 8-9 (1987). 
 26. Id. at 9. 
 27. Beirne Stedman, Right of Husband to Chastise Wife, 3 VA. L. REG. (N.S.) 241 (1917). 
 28. PLECK, supra note 25, at 9. 
 29. Stedman, supra note 27, at 243-46.  The earliest reported case appears to be Bread’s 
Case, 2 Bland 563 (Chancery 1681), in which a Maryland chancery court ordered a husband not 
to harm his wife greater than that permitted by chastisement. 
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the court relied on either Blackstone or English common law.30  For example, 
in 1824, the Supreme Court of Mississippi explicitly recognized the right of 
chastisement in the case of Bradley v. State.31  The court quoted both 
Blackstone and an English case.32  Relying on these precedents, the court held: 
To screen from public reproach those who may be thus unhappily situated, let 
the husband be permitted to exercise the right of moderate chastisement, in 
cases of great emergency, and use salutary restraints in every case of 
misbehavior, without being subjected to vexatious prosecutions, resulting in 
the mutual discredit and shame of all parties concerned.33 
In addition, the court acknowledged the right must be exercised within 
limitations of “reasonableness,” including using a “whip or rattan, no bigger 
than my thumb.”34  In 1836, the New Hampshire Supreme Court relied on 
English common law to acknowledge the husband’s right to control his wife by 
force.35  North Carolina, Mississippi, Alabama, and Pennsylvania all followed 
suit.36 
Toward the last half of the nineteenth century, courts began to reject the 
husband’s right of chastisement.37  The retreat from Blackstone’s position 
 
 30. See, e.g., Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143, 146-48 (1871) (citing 2 Kent’s Comm. 181). 
 31. Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 156 (1824). 
 32. Id. at 157. 
 33. Id. at 158. 
 34. Id. at 157. 
 35. Poor v. Poor, 8 N.H. 307, 316 (1836).  In this case, the wife sought a divorce based on 
extreme cruelty from being beaten with a club and whipped with a horse whip.  The court denied 
her claims, citing to the English case, reported at 2 Eng. Ecclesiastical R. 163, 164.  While the 
court rejected a blanket right of chastisement, the court found that the husband’s actions were 
justified in response to the actions of the wife.  As the court stated: 
And we are of opinion, on the whole, that however obnoxious to censure the conduct of 
the husband may have been on any, or on all the occasions to which we have adverted, the 
wife has no right to complain; because it is in the highest degree probable that in every 
instance she drew down upon herself the chastisement she received, by her own improper 
conduct.  And it does not appear that on any occasion the injury she received was much 
out of proportion to her offence.  Her remedy is to be sought, then, not in this court, but in 
a reformation of her own manners.  Let her return to the path of duty; and if to a discreet 
and prudent exercise of her just rights and privileges as a wife, she will join that 
meekness, patience and kindness which the religion she professes inculcates, and temper 
all her conduct towards her husband with that sweetness and goodness which belong to 
the true character of a wife, we think she will have no reasonable ground to apprehend 
any further injury to her person.  Let her submit to the authority of her husband, and 
remember that the dignity of a wife cannot be violated by such submission.  Let her return 
to the path of duty; and by displaying in all her conduct the mild and gentle spirit of the 
gospel, make that path a path of peace and safety. 
Poor, 8 N.H. at 319-20. 
 36. Murray, supra note 13, at 442. 
 37. Stedman, supra note 27, at 246-48. 
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regarding the right of a husband to beat his wife can be observed in the works 
of several American legal scholars.  In 1848, Francis Wharton stated that, “By 
the ancient common law, the husband possessed the power of chastising his 
wife, though the tendency of criminal courts in the present day is to regard the 
marital relation as no defence to a battery.”38  The first states to legislate 
against domestic violence were Tennessee in 1850 and Georgia in 1857.39  In 
1871, the Supreme Court of Alabama rejected the right of chastisement.40  Its 
rejection, however, acknowledged the recent existence of the right of 
chastisement: 
Judge Blackstone . . . published his commentaries above one hundred years 
ago, when society was much more rude . . . than it is at the present day in this 
country; and the exercise of a rude privilege there is no excuse for a like 
privilege here . . . .  The wife is not to be considered as the husband’s slave.  
And the privilege, ancient though it be, to beat her with a stick, to pull her hair, 
choke her, spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like 
indignities, is not now acknowledged by our law.41 
It is clear, therefore, that the American judicial system expressly sanctioned 
domestic violence until the middle of the nineteenth century.42 
B. The Rise of Privacy Discourse and Implicit Sanction of Domestic Violence 
The movement away from the rule of chastisement was brought about by 
reform that expanded the legal rights of women.  This transformation, 
however, did not end the legal sanction of domestic violence.  On the contrary, 
at the same time that courts were rejecting the husband’s right to beat his wife, 
courts employed a growing societal privacy discourse, thereby removing 
domestic violence from the purview of the law.  The result was that at the 
exact moment when the law rejected express permission to domestic violence, 
the courts implicitly condoned domestic violence by adhering to notions of 
domestic privacy.  
 
 38. FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 314 
(1846). 
 39. PLECK, supra note 25, at 63. 
 40. Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143 (1871). 
 41. Id. at 146-47. 
 42. The connection between the rejection of the rule of chastisement and the rise of 
abolitionism is interesting.  The courts appear to have made a distinction between the rights of 
white men and those of black slaves.  See Siegel, supra note 15, at 2134-41.  See also COTT supra 
note 19, at 80 (comparing the rights of freed slaves after the Civil War with the rights of women).  
For a general discussion of domestic violence and the Thirteenth Amendment, see Joyce E. 
McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude and the Thirteenth 
Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207 (1992). 
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1. The Changing Legal Status of Women in America 
The English common law of coverture and unities remained the law in 
America until nearly the 1850s.  Toward the middle of the nineteenth century, 
states began to recognize that women remained individuals, even during 
marriage.43  Changes in the legal status of women — and inroads into the 
rejection of the concepts of coverture and unities — were reflected in the 
married women’s property and earnings acts of that period.44  Although there 
was often a difference between recognition of full equality and the ability to 
exercise that equality,45 there is no question that the legal status of women was 
dramatically different in the mid 1800s.  Women now had the legal right to 
contract, to sue, and to testify.46 
2. Rise of Privacy Discourse and Creation of Private Realm 
The increased rights of women in the middle of the nineteenth century 
began to alter the balance of power between husbands and wives.47  In 
addition, the expanding legal rights of women challenged traditional male 
dominance and authority over the family.48  While legal reforms secured 
women greater rights, these efforts were unsuccessful at legally establishing 
actual equality for women.49 
 
 43. Dalton, supra note 18, at 327. 
 44. Id.  See, e.g., Townsend v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646 (Mo. 1986) (discussing 
Missouri’s Married Women’s Act).  The Act recognized a woman’s right to “transact business . . . 
to contract and be contracted with, to sue and be sued, and to enforce and have enforced against 
her property such judgments as may be rendered for and against her, and [to] sue and be sued at 
law or in equity, with or without her husband being joined as a party.”  Id. at 647-48.  Missouri 
first recognized these rights by case law in 1855.  Id. at 647.  See also PLECK, supra note 25, at 
94. 
Lucinda Chandler [a Quaker reformer] attempted in 1873 to repeal the law of coverture in 
the District of Columbia.  Chandler wanted to give every woman “the legal custody and 
control of her person in wifehood to govern according to her wisdom and instinct the 
maternal office and protect her children as well as she may from the dangers of selfish 
passion, alcoholism, and vice.” 
Id. 
 45. See Townsend, 708 S.W.2d at 650.  For nearly 100 years after the passage of the 
Missouri Married Women’s Act, Missouri courts refused to enforce the rights included in the Act.  
Finally, in Townsend, the Missouri Supreme Court gave full effect to the 1889 statute.  Id.  See 
generally Dalton, supra note 18. 
 46. Dalton, supra note 18, at 327. 
 47. HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 218 (2000). 
 48. Id. at 218; see COTT, supra note 19, at 80 (detailing a discussion surrounding the passage 
of the 13th Amendment prohibiting slavery, and noting that earlier versions of the amendment 
that might have been interpreted to allow for the equality of husbands and wives were rejected as 
being too broad). 
 49. PLECK, supra note 25, at 106-07. 
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Around this time, American society began to articulate a discourse of 
privacy that created and preserved a private realm for women.  As Frances 
Olsen detailed: 
In the early nineteenth century, as men’s work was largely removed to the 
factory while women’s work remained primarily in the home, there came to be 
a sharp dichotomy between “the home” and “the [workaday] world.”  This 
dichotomy took on many of the moral overtones developed in the theological 
dichotomy between heaven and earth.  Often the home was referred to as 
“sacred” . . . .  The family and home were seen as safe repositories for the 
virtues and emotions that people believed were being banished from the work 
of commerce and industry.  The home was said to provide a haven from the 
anxieties of modern life – a shelter for those moral and spiritual values which 
the commercial spirit and the critical spirit were threatening to destroy.50 
The economic realities were coupled with a powerful shift in public 
discourse regarding the role of women in society.51  Prior to the American 
Revolution, men were viewed as the primary embodiments of the American 
spirit of republicanism.52  Partially in response to a perceived erosion of public 
decency due to the economic explosion following the American Revolution, 
women were being discussed as the guardians of the future of the nation.53 
 
 50. Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1499 (1983) (quotation omitted). 
 51. Gerda Lerner, The Lady and the Mill Girl: Changes in the Status of Women in the Age of 
Jackson, in OUR AMERICAN SISTERS: WOMEN IN AMERICAN LIFE AND THOUGHT 132 (Jean E. 
Friedman, William G. Shade, and Mary Jane Capozzoli eds., 1987). 
The image of “the lady” was elevated to the accepted ideal of femininity toward which all 
women would strive.  In this formulation of values lower class women were simply 
ignored.  The actual lady was, of course, nothing new on the American scene; she had 
been present ever since colonial days.  What was new in the 1830’s was the cult of the 
lady, her elevation to a status symbol.  The advancing prosperity of the early nineteenth 
century made it possible for middle class women to aspire to the status formerly reserved 
for upper class women.  The “cult of true womanhood” of the 1830’s became a vehicle for 
such aspirations.  Mass circulation newspapers and magazines made it possible to teach 
every woman how to elevate the status of her family by setting “proper” standards of 
behavior, dress and literary tastes.  Godey’s Lady’s Book and innumerable gift books and 
tracts of the period all preached the same gospel of “true womanhood” – piety, purity, 
domesticity.  Those unable to reach the goal of becoming ladies were to be satisfied with 
the lesser goal - acceptance of their “proper place” in the home. 
Id. 
 52. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 356 (1992). 
 53. CATHERINE CLINTON, THE OTHER CIVIL WAR: AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY 147-48 (1984). “Christian morality and domestic ideology preached a hard line: women 
were the guardians of the family, the conscience of the household.  Women were expected to 
fulfill the dictates of their domestic roles as well as provide the family with unimpeachable moral 
example.”  Id. 
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[W]ives and mothers were now urged to use their special talents to cultivate in 
their husbands and children the proper moral feelings – the virtue, 
benevolence, and social affections – necessary to hold a sprawling and 
competitive republican society together.54 
The result of the new economic realities and the new republican virtue 
discourse was the creation of separate spheres for men and women.55  Women 
were in charge of the private sphere of the household and raising and educating 
children and as such were the guardians of the spirituality of the nation.56  Men 
were in charge of the public sphere of commerce and the economy.57  While 
the relegation of women to the private sphere of family and home had 
important impacts on women,58 in the context of domestic violence, its 
significance lay in non-intervention of the law into the private realm.59 
3. Reflection of Privacy Discourse in the Criminal Law 
The same court decisions that rejected the rule of chastisement 
incorporated the public-private dichotomy discourse to limit the reach of the 
criminal law.  In her discussion of the 1868 North Carolina case of State v. 
Rhodes, Reva Siegel details the transformation from the outright legality of 
domestic violence to tacit sanction through non-intervention based on 
preservation of the private sphere.60  In Rhodes, the husband beat his wife with 
 
 54. WOOD, supra note 52, at 357. 
 55. Id.  See also Lerner, supra note 51, at 134. 
 56. John S. C. Abbott, The Mother at Home; or the Principles of Maternal Duty, Familiarly 
Illustrated (1833), in EARLY AMERICAN WOMEN: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 1600-1900, at 
209 (Nancy Woloch, ed. 1992). 
When our land is filled with pious and patriotic mothers, then will it be filled with 
virtuous and patriotic men . . . O mothers! reflect upon the power your Maker has placed 
in your hands!  There is no earthly influence to be compared with yours.  There is no 
combination of causes so powerful in promoting the happiness or the misery of our race, 
as the instructions of home.  In a most peculiar sense God has constituted you the 
guardians and the controllers of the human family. 
Id. 
 57. Olsen, supra note 50, at 1499-1501. 
 58. Id. at 1500. 
The market/family dichotomy tended to exclude women from the world of the 
marketplace while promising them a central role in the supposedly equally important 
domestic sphere.  The dichotomy encouraged women to be generous and nurturant but 
discouraged them from being strong and self-reliant; it insulated women from the world’s 
corruption but denied them the world’s stimulation.  While the dichotomy tended to mask 
the inferior, degraded position of women, it also provided a degree of autonomy and a 
base from which women could and did elevate their status. 
Id. 
 59. Id. at 1504-07. 
 60. Siegel, supra note 15, at 2154-61. 
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a switch.61  While the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, 
stating it would not recognize proper chastisement, it went on to say that the 
court in the future will not intervene into the private realm of domestic 
relations: 
The courts have been loath to take cognizance of trivial complaints arising out 
of the domestic relations – such as master and apprentice, teacher and pupil, 
parent and child, husband and wife.  Not because those relations are not 
subject to law, but because the evil of publicity would be greater than the evil 
involved in the trifles complained of; and because they ought to be left to 
family government . . . [T]he ground upon which we have put this decision, is 
not, that the husband has the right to whip his wife much or little; but that we 
will not interfere with family government in trifling cases.  We will no more 
interfere where the husband whips the wife, than where the wife whips the 
husband; and yet we would hardly be supposed to hold, that a wife has a right 
to whip her husband.  We will not inflict upon society the greater evil of 
raising the curtain upon domestic privacy, to punish the lesser evil of trifling 
violence.62 
In order to preserve the private sphere, the law would not interfere.  Violence 
against women occurring within that private sphere, therefore, was beyond the 
protection of the law.63  The public-private dichotomy had the practical effect 
of sanctioning violence against women, though, unlike chastisement, it did not 
explicitly sanction such violence.64 
C. The Battered Women’s Movement and the Feminist Critique of the Public-
Private Dichotomy in Domestic Violence 
Beginning in the 1970s, the women’s movement questioned the relegation 
of women to the private sphere.65  Specifically, the battered women’s 
movement challenged the relegation of violence against women to the private 
sphere and the law’s non-intervention into that sphere.  The efforts of the 
battered women’s movement contributed to a significant shift in the way 
society viewed domestic violence.  It enabled public recognition of the private 
harm.66 
 
 61. State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 453 (1868). 
 62. Id. at 454-59. 
 63. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 984-85 (1991) 
[hereinafter Schneider, Privacy].  See also Raeder, supra note 8, at 1466. 
 64. Dalton, supra note 18, at 329. 
 65. Rice, supra note 4, at 941. 
 66. Id. (citing A. Reneé Callahan, Will the “Real” Battered Woman Please Stand Up?  In 
Search of a Realistic Definition of Battered Women’s Syndrome, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 117, 119-120 (1994)). 
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One of the central insights of feminist legal scholarship has been to 
identify public-private dichotomies in the American legal system and to assess 
the impact of such dichotomies.67  According to feminist scholars, the impact 
of the creation of separate spheres and the isolation of women in the private 
sphere is twofold.68  First, women are confined to the private sphere of family 
and domestic life; men are free to operate in the public world of the 
marketplace and government.69  Women, therefore, are limited in their options 
and are shielded from public scrutiny.  According to feminist scholarship, the 
isolation of women into the private sphere has contributed to the subjugation of 
women in American society.  As Elizabeth Schneider comments: 
The rhetoric of privacy that has insulated the female world from the legal order 
sends an important ideological message to the rest of society.  It devalues 
women and their functions and says that women are not important enough to 
merit legal regulation . . . .  These are important messages, for denying 
woman’s humanity and the value of her traditional work are key ideological 
components in maintaining woman’s subordinate status.  The message of 
women’s inferiority is compounded by the totality of the law’s absence from 
the private realm.  In our society, law is for business and other important 
things.  The fact that the law in general claims to have so little bearing on 
women’s day-to-day concerns reflects and underscores their insignificance.  
Thus, the legal order’s overall contribution to the devaluation of women is 
greater than the sum of the negative messages conveyed by individual legal 
doctrines.70 
Second, the public-private dichotomy serves to remove the law from the 
private sphere and reserve it for the public sphere as the “proper” consideration 
of government.71  The State preserves the private realm which – by definition – 
is beyond the protection of the law.72  The result is, as Robin West states: 
 
 67. See, e.g., Sally Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the Persistence of Privacy, 61 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (2000); Olsen, supra note 50. 
 68. Several scholars have questioned the validity of a complete separation of the public and 
private.  As Elizabeth Schneider states: 
There is no realm of personal and family life that exists totally separate from the reach of 
the state.  The state defines both the family, the so-called private sphere, and the market, 
the so-called public sphere.  “Private” and “public” exist on a continuum.  Thus, in the so-
called private sphere of domestic and family life, which is purportedly immune from law, 
there is always the selective application of law.  Significantly, this selective application of 
law invokes “privacy” as a rationale for immunity in order to protect male domination. 
Schneider, Privacy, supra note 63, at 977. 
 69. Hannah L. Meils, A Lesson from NAFTA: Can the FTAA Function as a Tool for 
Improvement in the Lives of Working Women?, 78 IND. L.J. 877, 886 (2003). 
 70. Schneider, Privacy, supra note 63, at 978. 
 71. Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic 
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1869 (1996). 
 72. See generally Scheider, Privacy, supra note 63. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
326 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:313 
 
The Constitution protects the individual against abusive and violent state 
conduct, but not only does it not protect women against the abuse and violence 
that most threatens them, it perversely protects the sphere of privacy and 
liberty within which the abuse and violence takes place.73 
In the context of domestic violence, feminist legal scholars have identified 
two primary impacts of the public-private dichotomy: sanctioning violence 
against women and encouraging the individualization of domestic violence.74  
Viewing domestic violence as a private issue sanctions violence against 
women because the law refuses to intervene into the private realm in which the 
violence occurs.75 
The second insight of feminist scholarship in the domestic violence context 
is that the public-private dichotomy allows the issue of domestic violence to be 
viewed as a private, individual matter, not a subject for public concern.  As 
Schneider says, “By seeing woman-abuse as ‘private,’ we affirm it as a 
problem that is individual, that only involves a particular male-female 
relationship, and for which there is no social responsibility to remedy.”76  The 
public-private dichotomy, therefore, allows the individualization of domestic 
violence.  Society is free to view the issue not as a social epidemic but as an 
individual pathology.  The true nature of the issue is shielded from society at 
large or is denied by society at large. 
As a result of the battered women’s movement, the public-private 
dichotomy in the domestic violence arena began to break down.77  Society 
started to recognize domestic violence as a public harm, which justified state 
intervention into the private sphere.  Most states have enacted legislation 
specifically designed to overcome the private nature of the offense and to 
emphasize the public aspect of the issue.78  States adopted mandatory arrest 
laws, enabled battered women to obtain restraining orders, and enforced no-
drop policies which emphasized that the state – not the victim – was 
prosecuting the offense.79  In 1994, Congress enacted the Violence Against 
Women Act (“VAWA”), recognizing that domestic violence has national 
impact.80  VAWA also funded many police and prosecution efforts to combat 
domestic violence and made several domestic violence crimes federal 
 
 73. ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 120-21 (1994). 
 74. See generally Hanna, supra note 71, at 1869; Schneider, Privacy, supra note 63, at 983. 
 75. Hanna, supra note 71, at 1869.  See also CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM 
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 100 (1987). 
 76. Schneider, Privacy, supra note 63, at 983. 
 77. See generally Goldfarb, supra note 67. 
 78. Hanna, supra note 71, at 1857, 1859, 1869. 
 79. Id. at 1857-65. 
 80. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994). 
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offenses.81  The impact of increased public recognition of the private harm of 
domestic violence has been mixed.  The beginning of the breakdown in the 
public-private dichotomy has brought relief to millions of American women 
who previously had suffered in silence.  This has been a significant and 
important move forward in the battle against domestic violence. 
Unfortunately, the numbers tell a less positive story.  According to the 
United States Department of Justice, the greatest cause of injuries to women in 
the United States is still domestic violence.82  The statistics are compelling and 
can be broken down into many permutations.83  A batterer beats a woman 
approximately every twelve seconds.84  Four million women a year are 
victimized by domestic violence,85 and nearly 2000 women die every year 
from domestic violence.86  According to some estimates, half of all the women 
in the country suffer an abusive relationship during their lifetime.87  Women 
are two hundred times more likely to be assaulted by a family member than by 
someone who is not a family member.88  Standing alone, these statistics should 
give pause.  Even more alarming is the fact that these figures have remained 
essentially unchanged despite legal efforts to overcome domestic violence.  
Even after thirty years of both express sanction against domestic violence and 
 
 81. Sally F. Goldfarb, No Civilized System of Justice: The Fate of the Violence Against 
Women Act, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 499, 504-05 (2000) (discussing various provisions of VAWA).  
VAWA also created a civil remedy for victims of domestic violence.  The Supreme Court struck 
down the civil remedy as unconstitutional in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 82. See supra note 4. 
 83. For example, “If every woman victimized by domestic violence in 1989 alone were to 
join hands in a line, the string of people would span from New York to Los Angeles and back 
again.”  Ogden, supra note 7, at 363. 
 84. Rice, supra note 4, at 940. 
 85. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 86. Female homicides committed by intimates were estimated in the year 2000 to be 
approximately 1,300.  See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, HOMICIDE 
TRENDS IN THE U.S., INTIMATE HOMICIDE, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/ 
intimates.htm (revised Nov. 21, 2002).  Estimates of female homicides by intimates reveal a 
larger number in 1976 (approximately 1,600) with declining figures through 1995 (approximately 
1,300).  See SILENT WITNESS NATIONAL INITIATIVE, STATISTICS ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
available at http://www.silentwitness.net/sub/violences.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2004).  But other 
sources have estimated that as many as 3,000 women were murdered by their intimates in 1976 
and 2,000 women died at the hands of their spouse, former spouse, or boyfriend as recently as 
1996.  See GREENFELD, supra note 9, at v, l. 
 87. Ogden, supra note 7, at 363. 
 88. “[W]omen suffering violent victimizations are almost twice as likely to be injured if the 
offender was an intimate rather than a stranger.”  Raeder, supra note 8, at 1467 (citing RONET 
BACHMAN, UNITED STATES DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN iii (1994)).  
“Women and children die at a rate of three per day due to beatings at the hands of someone they 
love.”  Ogden, supra note 7, at 363. 
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public recognition of domestic violence, domestic violence remains the single 
greatest cause of injury to women in America.89 
In an effort to expose the true repetitive nature of domestic violence – and 
to explain why women stayed in violent relationships – the battered women’s 
movement attempted to articulate and analyze the dynamics of a domestic 
violence relationship.  The first attempt embraced the paradigm of the “cycle 
of violence.”90  Violence within intimate relationships was presented as 
following fairly typical patterns and phases.91  These phases were defined as 
the tension-building phase, the violent phase, and the honeymoon phase,92 and 
together they constituted the cycle of violence.93  At the same time, the 
battered women’s movement sought to defend women accused of killing their 
batterers.94  The culmination of this effort was the recognition of the battered 
woman syndrome.95  A negative result of the public presentation of domestic 
violence as a cycle of violence and the creation of the battered woman 
syndrome was that domestic violence relationships and parties were cast in 
stagnant roles with readily recognizable characteristics.96  Without question, 
these two efforts were critical to raising public awareness of the epidemic of 
 
 89. Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Law Sanctuaries, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 321, 372 
(2003). 
 90. See De Sanctis, supra note 8, at 369 (citing LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED 
WOMAN 55 (1979)); Letendre, supra note 10, at 976. 
 91. See id. at 369-70. 
 92. Unfortunately, it is during the honeymoon phase when the batterer is seeking forgiveness 
and the victim sees hope of reconciliation that efforts toward prosecution of the batterer also 
occur, which often causes initially cooperative victims to begin actively working against the 
prosecution, sometimes to the point of cooperating with defense attorneys, hiring defense 
attorneys for the batterer, and posting bail for the batterer’s release.  De Sanctis, supra note 8, at 
369-70. 
 93. See Letendre, supra note 10, at 976. 
Minor episodes of violence may occur in the tension-building stage where individuals 
cope by avoiding or placating their batterers.  In the next phase, explosive or acute 
battering incidents occur, which may last from a few minutes to several days.  [In the] 
honeymoon phase . . . the batterer showers the victim with apologies, love, and affection. 
Id. at 976 (citing WALKER, supra note 90, at 56-70).  But see R. Emerson Dobash & Russell P. 
Dobash, The Nature and Antecedents of Violent Events, 24 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 269, 283 
(1984) (indicating that some batterers proceed directly from inflicting physical violence back to a 
tension-building stage). 
 94. See generally ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST 
LAWMAKING 112-47 (2000) [hereinafter SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN]. 
 95. See Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in 
Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 420-23 (1991) (discussing rules of evidence 
which allow certain types of evidence in cases raising the “battered woman” defense). 
 96. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 94, at 60-62, 72, 120.  See also LENORE E. 
WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 75-94 (1984) (discussing the personality 
characteristics of the battered woman). 
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domestic violence.  However, they presented significant problems to 
prosecution of domestic violence.97  The bottom line was that the roles 
assigned to the parties of a domestic violence relationship did not fit reality. 
In recent years, domestic violence advocates have proposed a different 
framework for conceptualizing battering relationships.  These theorists posit 
that the domestic violence relationship is not about conflict; rather, it is simply 
about power and control.98  According to this theory, domestic violence is a 
 
 97. “For every 100 domestic assaults, only 14 assaults are reported, 1.5 batterers are 
arrested, and 0.49 defendants are convicted.”  Letendre, supra note 10, at 978 (citing DONALD G. 
DUTTON, THE DOMESTIC ASSAULT OF WOMEN: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
PERSPECTIVES 223 (1995) [hereinafter DUTTON, PERSPECTIVES]).  See also De Sanctis, supra 
note 8, at 367.  “Victims of domestic violence are uncooperative in approximately eighty to 
ninety percent of cases.”  Id.  Domestic violence prosecutions are also complicated by recanting 
victims, lack of corroborating witnesses and physical evidence, lack of meaningful punishments, 
and juror bias against domestic violence victims.  Various reasons for domestic violence victims’ 
reluctance have been noted by both researchers and the courts including: fear of retaliation, 
coercion by the perpetrator via promises that future violence will stop if the victim recants, and a 
lack of faith in the justice system as a means of protection from future violence.  Ogden, supra 
note 7, at 373-74 (citing State v. Grant, 920 P.2d 609, 613 n.5 (Wash. 1996)) (discussing research 
as to why domestic violence victims may appear inconsistent when responding to abuse).  
Letendre, supra note 10, at 980-82 (providing a detailed discussion of male juror bias, female 
juror bias and general juror expectations of domestic violence situations that combine to create a 
tendency for jurors to accept the notion that the victim is partly to blame for her own battering).  
“Without evidence [such as would be offered except for the character evidence prohibition] to 
dispel these biases, jurors are inclined to believe the batterer over the victim, thereby increasing 
the difficulty of convicting domestic violence perpetrators.”  Id. at 982.  See also De Sanctis, 
supra note 8, at 371-73, (providing additional discussion of gender bias in domestic violence 
cases). 
The lingering effects of this country’s history of sexism include according a woman’s 
testimony less credibility than that granted to a man’s testimony.  The woman witness is 
thought to be less rational and have less accurate testimonial qualities such as memory, 
perception, and narration.  She is also thought to be less trustworthy and more willing to 
exaggerate. 
Id. at 373 (citing CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL COUNCIL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENDER BIAS IN 
THE COURTS, ACHIEVING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR MEN AND WOMEN IN THE COURTS § 6, 4-5 
(1990)). 
 98. Daniel Jay Sonkin & William Fazio, Domestic Violence Expert Testimony in the 
Prosecution of Male Batterers, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL 
DIMENSIONS OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 218, 222-23 (Daniel Jay Sonkin ed., 1987); Martha R. 
Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH L. 
REV. 1, 53 (1991).  Some scholars have also noted that “[t]he psychological control of abused 
parties through intermittent use of physical assault along with psychological abuse (verbal abuse, 
isolation, threats of violence, etc.) is typical of domestic violence and is the same set of control 
tactics used by captors against prisoners of war and hostages.”  Anne L. Ganley, Domestic 
Violence: The What, Why and Who, as Relevant to Criminal and Civil Court Domestic Violence 
Cases, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE MANUAL FOR JUDGES 2-5 to 2-6 (Helen Halpert et. al. eds., 
1997). 
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pattern of verbal and physical abuse directed at an individual in order to 
control the behavior of that person.99  Because the inherent goal of the abuse is 
control over the victim, batterers seldom stop at a single violent incident, and 
past violent behavior in a relationship is a good predictor of future violence, as 
“data indicate that, about 63% of the time, if assaults occur once, they are 
likely to be repeated.”100 
The batterer’s behavior can take many forms.101  Some common 
manifestations of that behavior are economic or financial restrictions,102 
physical and emotional isolation, repeated invasions of privacy and monitoring 
of behavior, severing support from family or friends, threats of violence toward 
the victim, threats of suicide, addicting the victim to drugs or alcohol, and 
physical or sexual assaults.103 
The purpose of the abusive behavior is to subjugate the victim and to 
establish the superiority of the batterer.104  Subjugation and superiority create 
constant tension.105  The notion of cycles of violence with alternating periods 
of violence and respite do not reflect reality.106  Women report varying degrees 
of tension, but rarely describe periods of relief from the efforts of the batterer 
 
 99. James Martin Truss, The Subjection of Women . . . Still: Unfufilled Promises for Women 
Victims of Domestic Violence, 26 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1149, 1167 (1995). 
 100. DUTTON, PERSPECTIVES, supra note 97, at 8-9.  Moreover, when an abuser moves on to 
another relationship, it is highly likely that he will continue to use abuse and violence as a 
mechanism for control over his new partner.  Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: 
Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 71, 85 (1992). 
 101. “Injuries sustained by women as a result of marital violence range from bruises, cuts, 
black eyes, concussions, broken bones, and miscarriages to permanent injuries – such as damage 
to joints, partial loss of hearing or vision, scars from burns, bites or knife wounds, or even death.”  
Angela Browne, Violence in Marriage: Until Death Do Us Part, in VIOLENCE BETWEEN 
INTIMATE PARTNERS: PATTERNS, CAUSES AND EFFECTS 50, 52 (Albert P. Cardarelli ed., 1977). 
 102. If a victim of domestic violence leaves here abuser “there is a 50% chance that her 
standard of living will drop below the poverty line.”  De Sanctis, supra note 8, at 368 (citing 
National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women, Statistics Packet 39-40) (3d ed. Feb. 
1994). 
 103. “[The] power and control wheel is commonly used to explain the many facets of 
domestic violence, which includes coercion and threats, intimidation, emotional abuse, isolation, 
minimization, denial and blaming, use of children to control the victim, use of male privilege and 
economic resource abuse.”  Raeder, supra note 8, at 1471 (citing Mary Ann Dutton, 
Understanding Women’s Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman 
Syndrome,  21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1206 (1993) [hereinafter Dutton, Understanding]).  See 
also Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive 
Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 975, 983 (1995). 
 104. Dobash & Dobash, supra note 93, at 286; NEIL S. JACOBSON & JOHN M. GOTTMAN, 
WHEN MEN BATTER WOMEN: NEW INSIGHTS INTO ENDING ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIPS 29 (1998). 
 105. Dobash & Dobash, supra note 93, at 283. 
 106. Id. 
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to subjugate them.107  The concept of power and control better reflects the 
reality that each victim is unique, that each batterer presents a different 
combination of battering behavior, and that each victim responds differently to 
that pattern of behavior.108  The success of the superiority/subjugation battle 
varies with each woman and with each relationship.109  As one scholar notes, 
“In domestic violence cases, this translates to individual acts of abuse, forming 
a blueprint that details how to control the victim, even though the act may 
differ in type and severity.  Therefore, intimidation, stalking, assault and 
property crimes are all integral to the grand design.”110  Furthermore, the 
notion that tensions increase until a breaking point is reached suggests that the 
defendant is, at that point, not in control of the situation.  Recent studies 
demonstrate exactly the opposite is true.111  Rather than being a crime of 
passion, researchers are discovering that domestic violence is a calculated and 
focusing event for the batterer that reinforces his ability to control his 
victim.112  The batterer may often be more in control during an act of violence 
than before or after.113 
Contemporary scholarship provides crucial insights into the realities of 
domestic violence, realities that lend coherence to a new application of the 
character evidence rule in domestic violence cases.114  These realities of the 
battering relationship show that the crime of domestic violence is not an 
isolated instance of misbehavior that can be strictly defined as to date and 
time.115  Rather, it is a long-term pattern of behavior that involves a variety of 
behaviors.116 
 
 107. Id. at 283; Dutton, Understanding, supra note 103, at 1206-07; Stark, supra note 103, at 
975, 983. 
 108. Raeder, supra note 8, at 283. 
 109. Patterns of abuse naturally vary according to the interactive relationship of the batterer 
and his victim.  The intimacy of the relationship offers the batterer the insight to know what 
psychological and physical abuses work to achieve control over his victim.  “There is no single 
typology of psychological abuse which has been consistently used in social science, and there is 
no one profile of batterers.”  Raeder, supra note 8, at 1471, (citing Dutton, Understanding, supra 
note 103, at 1205 and DONALD G. DUTTON & SOSAN K. GOLANT, THE BATTERER: A 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE 25 (1995)). 
 110. Raeder, supra note 8, at 1496. 
 111. JACOBSON & GOTTMAN, supra note 104, at 28-29.  Jacobson and Gottman studied 201 
couples in conflict in controlled settings.  Id.  They discovered that the heart rate of nearly one 
fifth of batterers dropped during violence.  Id.  Jacobson and Gottman concluded that for these 
batterers, the violence was deliberate, focused, and controlled.  Id. 
 112. Letendre, supra note 10, at 977. 
 113. JACOBSEN & GOTTMAN, supra note 104, at 29. 
 114. Raeder, supra note 8, at 1465, 1493, 1505. 
 115. See generally DUTTON & GOLANT, supra note 109, at 39-52. 
 116. Id. at 22-23. 
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D. Perpetuation of the Privacy Discourse through the 
 Character Evidence Ban 
The increased prosecution efforts, spurred by the battered women’s 
movement, have come into conflict with the character evidence ban, which 
precludes evidence of the defendant’s prior acts of domestic violence from 
being introduced in the current prosecution.  Given the repetitive nature of 
domestic violence, the character evidence ban is at issue in nearly every 
domestic violence case.  The result has been that the character evidence ban 
has limited the reach of the public recognition of the private violence and 
perpetuated the implicit sanction of domestic violence. 
1. The Character Evidence Rule 
Federal Rule of Evidence (“FRE”) 404 establishes the general prohibition 
on admission of the defendant’s character: 
(a) Character Evidence Generally – Evidence of a person’s character or a trait 
of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of Accused – Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by 
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of 
character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by an accused and 
admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the 
accused offered by the prosecution; 
(2) Character of Alleged Victim – Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of 
the alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to 
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged 
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the 
alleged victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of Witness – Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided 
in rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts – Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts 
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such 
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, 
the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of 
trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of 
the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.117 
 
 117. FED. R. EVID. 404. 
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The general rule is that a defendant’s character – including evidence of 
prior acts of violence – is not admissible to show that, with regard to the 
charged crime, the defendant acted consistently with his established 
character.118  In other words, the defendant’s prior bad acts cannot be used to 
show that the defendant committed the present charged crime.  While the rule 
allows for certain exceptions, the general character ban is included in the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and the evidence codes of every state.  Indeed, the 
character evidence rule “is so deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence as to 
assume almost constitutional proportions.”119 
2. The Importance of the Character Evidence Rule in Domestic Violence 
Prosecutions 
No other evidence rule goes to the heart of a particular crime the way that 
the character evidence rule does with domestic violence.  The fundamental 
nature of domestic violence is that it is behavior repeated over time.120  In the 
domestic violence context, the character evidence ban denies the nature of 
domestic violence, creates an unlevel playing field that reinforces negative and 
inaccurate stereotypes about women, and perpetuates violence against women. 
i. Denial of Women’s Realities 
One troubling statistic in domestic violence cases is that, on average, 
women do not involve the police until after the seventh incident of violence 
within the relationship.121  This statistic tells us that by the time women are 
involved in the criminal justice system as domestic violence victims, they have 
already been victimized repeatedly.122  Women do not enter courtrooms as 
victims of isolated incidents of violence.  Rather, they suffer a pattern of 
violence meant to accomplish subjugation and control.123  Each incident of 
 
 118. See id. 
 119. FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE AND RULES 250-51, 56 F.R.D. 183, 219 (1972) (Advisory 
Committee Note on subdivision (a)). 
 120. See supra notes 7-8. 
 121. Dutton, Understanding, supra note 109, at 1213.  See also BEVERLY FORD, VIOLENT 
RELATIONSHIPS: BATTERING AND ABUSE AMONG ADULTS 8 (2001) (indicating that only ten 
percent of domestic violence incidents are reported to the police). 
 122. See supra notes 7-8. 
 123. It is noteworthy that recent studies have shown a similar use of violence as a control 
mechanism over women in cases of heterosexual rape.  “In some American subcultures, violence 
is a socially approved way of getting what one wants, including control over other persons.  One 
way men can control women is to force them to submit to degrading activities, including sexual 
intimacy against their will.”  Thomas J. Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of Uncharged 
Misconduct Evidence in Sex Offender Cases, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 147 (citing A. Nicholas 
Groth & Ann W. Burgess, Rape: A Sexual Deviation, in MALE RAPE: A CASEBOOK OF SEXUAL 
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violence is critical to creating the pattern and accomplishing the control.124  
Further, the repetition of violence committed by intimate partners changes the 
nature of the victims’ stories; their stories are fundamentally different from the 
stories of victims of isolated, random violence at the hands of strangers.125 
For example, consider the experience of the female bank teller who is 
ordered at gun point to turn over the contents of her cash drawer.  To this 
woman, it matters little whether the robber has committed fourteen similar 
bank robberies.  There is nothing about the bank teller’s experience that is 
altered by the fact that it is the robber’s fifteenth bank.  Contrast this with the 
experience of the domestic violence victim who has been subjected to fourteen 
prior incidents of violence at the hands of her abuser.  The fifteenth incident 
derives a portion of its meaning and importance in its connection to the 
fourteen other incidents.  But the character evidence rule precludes discussing 
this pattern in court. 
The character evidence rule denies the domestic violence victim’s reality 
on two levels.  First, the fact of repetitive violence does not exist within the 
courtroom.  Second, the victim must discuss an isolated incident without its 
larger context of repetitive violence.  Isolating the incident from its context 
denies that which gives it a substantial part of its meaning.  A kick in the 
crotch is a significant violation of personal autonomy.  However, a kick in the 
crotch in context of past forced sexual activities may convey a different 
meaning.126  The current construction of the character evidence rule precludes 
the victim from discussing her more nuanced reality of the kick in the crotch. 
This denial of the victim’s reality within the courtroom has profound 
impact on the victim.  When victims are prevented from discussing their 
 
AGGRESSIONS 231, 234-35 (Anthony M. Scacco, Jr. ed., 1982) and CHARLES H. MCCAGHY, 
CRIME IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 124-29 (1980)). 
 124. See supra note 7. 
 125. Myrna S. Raeder, The Double-Edged Sword: Admissibility of Battered Woman 
Syndrome and Against Batterers in Cases Implicating Domestic Violence, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 
789, 792 (1996) [hereinafter Raeder, Double-Edged]. 
 126. Intimidation and humiliation of the victim by the batterer is part of the pattern of 
domestic violence.  Raeder, supra, note 8, at 1471.  To illustrate this point, Raeder recounts a 
circumstance from the relationship of O.J. Simpson and Nicole Brown Simpson in which 
Simpson’s actions toward his wife on two occasions were illustrative of the deeper meaning of 
the acts: 
Simpson placed his hand on his wife’s crotch and said that “this is where babies come 
from and this belongs to me, this is mine.”  [On another occasion] he [Simpson] told the 
police to get her [Nicole Brown Simpson] out of his bed because he had two women.  
These statements identified his wife’s value as merely reflective of her husband’s interest 
in her; she mattered only so long as he cared for her to matter.  This attitude is one which 
exemplifies why violence in a battering relationship is often an aspect of control 
dependent upon the batterer’s internal needs, not simply his wife’s conduct. 
Id. at 1471-72. 
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reality, they often become frustrated, confused, and disenfranchised.  The 
system that the victim turned to for protection mimics the abusive patterns of 
the relationship from which she is seeking refuge.  The purpose of battering is 
to create an altered reality for the victim so that she will bear the abuse.  One 
of the most powerful tools in the batterer’s arsenal is the ability to engage the 
societal stigma against victims by convincing the victim that if she reports the 
violence, she will either not be believed or will be blamed for not leaving the 
relationship.127  When the legal system denies the victim’s reality, it 
contributes to the social stigma against victims and directly reinforces the 
victim’s sense that her story is not believable, that it is not important. 
ii. Hides True Nature of Domestic Violence 
Because it suppresses the reality of the relationship, the character evidence 
rule also hides the true nature of domestic violence from the public.  When the 
victim is not permitted to place the charged incident into the pattern of abuse, 
the jury is permitted to believe that domestic violence incidents are isolated 
incidents, stemming primarily from conflict within the relationship.  In 
addition, the jury members – as representatives of society – are allowed only a 
limited view into what constitutes domestic violence.  The true nature of the 
problem is hidden from the jurors. 
The character evidence rule works powerfully to the disadvantage of 
women in domestic violence cases in another way.  At the same time that the 
legal system designed a ban on the character of the defendant, the rules 
evolved in such a way that the character of the victim was always relevant and 
admissible.128  The overwhelming majority of victims of domestic violence are 
women, and their character is admissible while the batterer’s character is 
not.129  Ironically, men’s character remains private, while women’s character is 
exposed to public discussion and adjudication.  The result of FRE 404 has been 
that the male abuser defines the discourse relating to the private sphere of the 
intimate relationship.  Male defendants have been able to discuss the private 
life of the victim because that goes to her credibility, while his own private life 
is protected.  In other words, FRE 404 creates an unlevel playing field that is 
tilted in favor of men.  Male domestic violence defendants are permitted to 
paint the character of female victims as irrational, overly emotional, hysterical, 
 
 127. Justine A. Dunlap, The Pitiless Double Abuse of Battered Mothers, 11 AMER. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 523, 524 (2003).  “A battered woman is stereotyped as weak, helpless, 
incapable or unwilling to redress the situation in which she finds herself.  This stereotype faults 
the battered woman for her batterer’s actions.”  Id. 
 128. See 1 WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN 
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 62, 194 (2d ed. 1923). 
 129. See De Sanctis, supra note 8, at 367 n.47; DUTTON, PERSPECTIVES, supra note 97, at 45. 
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and vindictive.130  Due to FRE 404, the jury hears only about the charged act; 
viewing the act in isolation strengthens the defendant’s arguments about the 
nature of the victim’s character: she is over-reacting to a single incident.131  
Through FRE 404, the legal system tells a truncated story about domestic 
violence.  The story is that the violence is an isolated incident in the life of this 
particular dysfunctional relationship, due mainly to the irrational character of 
the woman.  The story is at heart a fiction that perpetuates other fictions; 
namely, violence against women is somehow connected to, or caused by, the 
character or behavior of specific women.  This serves to conceal the real truth: 
society and the law condone male violence against women. 
There is a more subtle difficulty with FRE 404 at the intersection between 
the public’s understanding of domestic violence and the exposition of a 
domestic violence incident in the courtroom.  Due to the tremendous work of 
the women’s movement in general and the battered women’s movement 
specifically, society now has a better understanding of domestic violence.  
Even though much is still unknown about the magnitude of the problem, there 
is clearly more discussion of domestic violence in the media, movies, and 
magazines than at any other time in history.  There are many positive results 
from greater public awareness.  This greater public awareness, however, poses 
a significant problem in the courtroom, particularly in conjunction with FRE 
404. 
Due to the efforts of the public awareness campaign surrounding domestic 
violence, many jurors have preconceived notions of what constitutes a 
domestic violence relationship, regarding the characteristics and actions of 
battered women.132  The difficulty lies in the intersection of that preconceived 
understanding of domestic violence and the inadmissibility of prior acts of 
violence within the relationship.  The result is that the jury, expecting to see 
evidence about the cycle of violence, discounts the experience of the victim as 
not being “real” domestic violence because she is allowed to discuss only one 
incident.133 
For example, the popular perception of the battered woman is one who 
resists the prosecution’s efforts and who will recant the statements she gave to 
the police implicating the batterer.  Jurors understand the fact that a victim will 
often recant her testimony due to coercion from the batterer or to protect 
 
 130. See supra note 97 (discussing juror bias in perceptions of domestic violence victims). 
 131. Id.  Furthermore, “When the jury is not given a complete picture of the abusive 
relationship, it has a false perception of the relationship as normal.  Without the [previous 
uncharged] acts, it is easier to portray the victim as a lying vengeful woman or to downgrade the 
seriousness of the attack.”  Raeder, supra note 8, at 1504. 
 132. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 94, at 124, 132. 
 133. Raeder, Double-Edged, supra note 125, at 794; Kathleen Waits, Battered Women and 
Their Children: Lessons from One Woman’s Story, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 29, 57 (1998). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2004] TRUE TO CHARACTER 337 
 
herself or her children.  The jurors are familiar with the idea that a victim will 
minimize the extent of the violence that occurred to her or attempt to take 
some of the blame for that violence.  When a victim does not recant or 
minimize the violence – and jurors are only permitted to hear about the isolated 
incident – the victim, then, does not qualify as a true domestic violence victim.  
The disconnect between the public perception of the battered woman and the 
non-recanting victim often leads jurors to view the woman as vindictive, not as 
a victim. 
Rather than removing the defendant’s character from the trial, the character 
evidence ban injects a false image of the defendant’s good character into the 
trial.  When the jury is precluded from hearing evidence of the defendant’s 
prior battering, they cannot see the defendant as a batterer.  The defendant can 
hide behind the half-truth of his virtuousness-by-absence at the same time that 
he attacks the victim’s character.134  The resulting disparity not only obscures 
the true nature of domestic violence, but it does so in conjunction with jurors’ 
expectations about domestic violence victims and defendants.135 
iii. Perpetuates Violence Against Women 
Finally, the character evidence rule perpetuates the public-private 
dichotomy and correspondingly, violence against women.  As discussed above, 
the rule denies the victim’s reality and hides the nature of domestic violence 
from juries.  The result is that fewer batterers are being held accountable.136 
 
 134. “By forbidding the use of evidence concerning the ongoing nature of abuse within the 
relationship, the law denies reality, and asks the jury to do the same.  There is no justice in this 
formula.”  Stuart H. Baggish & Christopher G. Frey, A Proposed Use for Evidence of Specific 
Similar Acts in Criminal Prosecutions to Corroborate Victim Testimony, 68 FLA. B.J. 57, 59 (Oct. 
1994). 
 135. Other writers agree that the rule frustrates the current understanding of the nature of 
domestic violence as a cyclical series of actions by a batterer toward his victim.  For example, 
Raeder writes, “[The current rule] reflects a completely unsophisticated view of domestic 
violence which flies in the face of the extensive literature discussing battering relationships.  
Although each abusive act is different, it typically plays a part in a scheme aimed at obtaining 
control over the victim.”  Raeder, supra note 8, at 1492. 
 136. Scholars advocating a domestic violence exception to the character evidence prohibition 
have asserted that batterers would hesitate to abuse their victim(s) if they knew they would be 
tried, and more likely convicted, if prior conduct was more readily admissible against them.  Rice, 
supra note 4, at 957.  Support for the deterrence factor of enhanced admissibility of prior 
domestic violence conduct to achieve greater accountability for batterers may also be found in the 
results of increased enforcement and publicity surrounding the crime of driving while intoxicated: 
Not long ago, drunk driving was not viewed as serious criminal behavior.  Instead, the 
drunk drivers were treated sympathetically on the theory that anyone could commit the 
offense.  As a result, extremely low sentences were the norm.  Yet, over time, led by 
Mothers Against Drunk Driving, attitudes began to change.  Today, when people attend 
social events it is commonplace to designate a driver who will not drink.  No longer do 
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The rule disenfranchises victims by denying their reality, at the same time 
that the rule allows the batterer to project a falsely positive, non-violent 
character.  The result is that the rule mimics some of the dynamics present in 
domestic violent relationships to the disadvantage of women.  Women are 
more reluctant to return to a system that treated them in a fashion similar to 
that of their abusers.  Women often feel forced to endure the violence or seek 
self-help. 
The character evidence rule’s preservation of a public-private dichotomy 
means that the private sphere remains shielded from legal action.  Within this 
private sphere, violence against women will continue to be considered a 
private matter and not the appropriate business of the state.  Because the vast 
majority of victims are women, preserving the private sphere works profoundly 
to the disadvantage of women.  Women will continue to be beaten in 
astounding numbers. 
III.  A CALL FOR A NEW RULE IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES 
The current use of the character evidence rule in the domestic violence 
context constitutes the legal system’s third means of protecting domestic 
violence from effective prosecution.  The character evidence ban has been a 
part of the common law for centuries and is often described as one of the three 
most important aspects of the Anglo-American legal system.137  A close 
examination of the intellectual foundations for the rule suggests a change in the 
rule for domestic violence cases. 
A. Wigmore and the Character Evidence Ban 
In 1904, John Wigmore produced his ten-volume work, A Treatise on the 
Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law.138  Wigmore’s 
work was hailed at the time as being one of the finest pieces of legal 
 
judges give light sentences on the theory that the defendant was simply unlucky and not 
blameworthy.  Similarly, legislatures have enacted more stringent laws concerning arrest, 
definition of offenses and mandatory sentencing, as well as required treatment programs.  
Society now reflects zero tolerance for behavior which was once acceptable . . . So, too, 
the publicity focused on domestic violence can be used to change attitudes. 
Raeder, supra note 8, at 1482-83 (citing Elizabeth M. Schneider, Epilogue: Making 
Reconceptualization of Violence Against Women Real, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1245, 1251 (1995) 
[hereinafter Schneider, Epilogue]).  See also Letendre, supra note 10, at 1003-04.  “[The] 
Washington domestic violence task force found that the law’s failure to address domestic 
violence ‘directly and appropriately’ fosters continued abuse.”  Id. (citing WASHINGTON STATE 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 2 (1991)). 
 137. See 1 WIGMORE, supra note 128, § 194, at 415-16. 
 138. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW (1904). 
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scholarship ever produced.139  Wigmore remains the “fundamental working 
source for scholars, practitioners and courts.”140  In many respects, Wigmore is 
the beginning and end of the discussion regarding a rule of evidence.  Time 
and again, legal scholarship pertaining to a rule of evidence grounds its 
discussion in Wigmore.  Exploration of the character evidence rule is no 
exception.141 
In attempting to discern the policy for the character evidence ban, 
Wigmore reviewed cases from 1684 to 1921.142  He distilled from the cases 
three primary arguments in support of the character evidence ban: the ban 
prevents (1) undue prejudice, (2) unfair surprise, and (3) confusion of the 
issues.143  Virtually every commentator quotes these same three rationales.144  
 
 139. Jon R. Waltz & Norman M. Garland, Book Review, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, 
120 U. PA. L. REV. 402 (1971).  See also Book Review, 39 AM. L. REV. 478 (1905) (Volumes III 
& IV).  The American University Law Review noted: “No one would ever dare to write on the 
same subject except to make supplements thereto.  Other writers may well study this work for 
system and thoroughness in detail; and when they have done this they will doubtless stop in 
despair.”  Id. 
 140. Ronan E. Degnan, Book Review Evidence in Trials at Common Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 
1590 (1974). 
 141. David P. Leonard, In Defense of Character Evidence Prohibition: Foundations of the 
Rule Against Trial by Character, 73 IND. L.J. 1161, 1166 (1998).  See also Susan Marlene 
Davies, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: A Reassessment of Relevancy, 27 CRIM. L. 
BULL. 504, 504 (1991); Karen M. Fingar, And Justice For All: The Admissibility of Uncharged 
Sexual Misconduct Evidence Under the Recent Amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 5 S. 
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 501, 511 n.52, 531 n.190, 538 n.231 (1996); David J. Karp, 
Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases and Other Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 15, 23 (1994); Raeder, supra note 8, at 1489. 
 142. Wigmore’s first volume came out in 1904-05.  Later volumes contained cases dating to 
1921. 
 143. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 128, § 194, at 418-19. 
“The reasons thus marshaled in various forms are reducible to [four]: (1) The over-strong 
tendency to believe the defendant guilty of the charge merely because he is a likely person 
to do such acts; (2) The tendency to condemn, not because he is believed guilty of the 
present charge, but because he has escaped unpunished from other offenses; both of these 
represent the principle of Undue Prejudice; (3) the injustice of attacking one necessarily 
unprepared to demonstrate that the attacking evidence is fabricated; this represents the 
principle of Unfair Surprise.  It is also said, by some judges (4) that the Confusion of new 
Issues is a reason for avoiding such evidence . . . .” 
Id. 
 144. But see Karp, supra note 141, at 27 (noting that the concern over undue prejudice to the 
defendant was not voiced in the cases most often cited when discussing the origins of the 
character evidence prohibitions.  Instead, he observes that the early decisions in Hampden’s Trial, 
9 How. St. Tr. 1053 (K.B. 1684) and Harrison’s Trial, 12 How. St. Tr. 833 (Old Bailey 1692), 
reflected concern over unfair surprise and the need to limit the proceedings, not concern over 
undue prejudice) (asserting that the absence of concern for undue prejudice in these cases 
suggests that different reasons lay behind the establishment of the character evidence rule). 
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In fact, it is difficult to find much analysis of the character evidence ban 
beyond these three arguments. 
Interestingly, Wigmore cast doubt on his own rationales.  First, he asserts 
that only the avoidance of undue prejudice has any support: 
The policy of avoiding undue prejudice is based on weaknesses of human 
nature which are today as obvious as ever.  In criminal cases, this policy is one 
of those that mark off the Anglo-American system from the rest of the 
civilized world . . . .  Our own rule represents a safeguard against a real danger 
to which the search for truth will always be liable so long as the decision of 
facts is committed to any but Solomons.145 
Second, Wigmore noted that other evidentiary rules excluding extrinsic 
evidence resolves confusion of the issues.146  Third, he stated that the policies 
of preventing unfair surprise and confusion of the issues have been “greatly 
overworked.”147  Fourth, he noted that the reasons he cited “represent general 
policies and constant quantities in our law of Evidence, and reappear 
individually in other parts of it.”148  Fifth, he suggested that judges have 
misapplied the rule out of leniency for the defendant rather than to protect the 
innocent.149  Finally, Wigmore lamented that the shortcomings of the rules of 
evidence derive primarily from a lack of acquaintance with legal history, 
philosophy, and jurisprudence.150  Wigmore asserts that: 
Another shortcoming is the over-emphasis on the technique of legal rules in 
detail, with corresponding under-emphasis on policies, reasons, and principles.  
This is a difficult thing to describe to those who do not sense it without 
description; but it is very marked.  It is the kind of thing that is like the dead 
bark on the outside of a tree, in contrast to the living, growing inner core.  Too 
much of our law is dead bark, – at least in the judicial opinions.  Two thirds or 
more of them are needless, – dry repetitions of well-settled things.  The 
treatment tends to become mechanical.  Reasons are lost from sight.  The new 
generation of judges thus never hears the reasons.  And so gradually “you 
cannot see the forest for the trees.”151 
The first step in vitalizing the character evidence rule, therefore, is to 
review the history of the rule and reasons which support it. 
B. History of the Character Evidence Ban 
 
 145. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 128, § 8a, at 131-32. 
 146. Id. § 194, at 419.  Wigmore does not refer to the rules regarding character or 
impeachment of witness, although he appears to be discussing these rules. 
 147. Id. § 8a, at 132. 
 148. Id. § 194, at 419. 
 149. Id. § 194, at 419-20. 
 150. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 128, § 8a, at 115. 
 151. Id. § 8a, at 117. 
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The American character evidence rule derives from the English common 
law and was imported into this country from England prior to the American 
Revolution.  The history in England is difficult to trace, but what is present 
suggests a growing trend through the seventeenth century toward acceptance of 
the character evidence ban.  Wigmore cited evidence that character evidence 
was widely used in English courts during the 1600s.152  He also noted, 
however, several cases toward the end of that century in which prior bad act 
evidence was not admissible.153  In 1684, a court refused evidence of a 
defendant’s prior forgeries during his forgery trial.154  In 1692, in the case of 
Harrison’s Trial, the court rejected prior bad act evidence during the 
defendant’s murder trial, stating, “Are you going to arraign his whole life?”155  
While he acknowledged that the practice of using the defendant’s character 
“died hard and slowly,” Wigmore asserted that the character evidence ban was 
a settled rule by the end of the 1600s:156 
In early practice this class of evidence [prior bad acts of the defendant] was 
resorted to without limitation.  But for more than two centuries, ever since the 
liberal reaction which began with the Restoration of the Stuarts, this policy of 
exclusion, in one or another of its reasonings, has received judicial sanction, 
more emphatic with time and experience.  It represents a revolution in the 
theory of criminal trials, and is one of the peculiar features, of vast moment, 
which distinguishes the Anglo-American from the Continental system of 
Evidence.157 
During the colonial period, American courts appear to have followed their 
English counterparts in precluding prior bad act evidence.  For example, in 
1763, the Massachusetts Supreme Court precluded evidence pertaining to the 
defendant’s prior misconduct.158  Indeed, there is strong evidence to suggest 
that the character evidence rule was becoming firmly established in America 
 
 152. Id. § 194, at 415 n.1. 
 153. Id. at 416.  Modern scholars have asserted that the character evidence ban can be traced 
to the waning of feudalism in England and the development of industrialization.  See also 
Leonard, supra note 141, at 1193; Fingar, supra note 141, at 510; Thomas J. Reed, Trial by 
Propensity: Admission of Other Criminal Acts Evidenced in Federal Criminal Trials, 50 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 713, 717 (1981). 
 154. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 128, § 194, at 416 (discussing Hampden’s Trial, 9 How. St. Tr. 
1053, 1103 (1684)). 
 155. Id. § 194, at 416. 
 156. Id. § 194, at 416 n.1; id. § 8, at 109.  But see JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF 
ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 180, 190-96 (2003).  Langbein argues that Wigmore placed the 
adoption of the character evidence rule too early.  Langbein suggests that the rule gained 
acceptance from 1684 to 1714 and was not fully established until 1744.  Id. at 195-96. 
 157. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 128, § 194, at 415-16 (emphasis added). 
 158. Rex v. Doaks, Quincy’s Mass. 90 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1763). 
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after the Revolution.159  Evidence scholars report cases from the early 1800s 
that employed the character evidence rule.160  By 1891, the rule had become so 
firmly entrenched that the United States Supreme Court stated: 
Proof of [prior crimes] only tended to prejudice the defendants with the jurors, 
to draw their minds away from the real issue, and to produce the impression 
that they were wretches whose lives were of no value to the community, and 
who were not entitled to the full benefit of the rules prescribed by law for the 
trial of human beings . . . .  However depraved in character, and however full 
of crime their past lives may have been, the defendants were entitled to be tried 
upon competent evidence, and only for the offense charged.161 
The universality of the acceptance of the character evidence rule can also 
be circumstantially established through the strength of statements endorsing 
the rule.  In 1901, the New York Court of Appeals stated: 
This [character evidence ban] rule, so universally recognized and so firmly 
established in all English-speaking lands, is rooted in that jealous regard for 
the liberty of the individual which has distinguished our jurisprudence from all 
others, at least from the birth of the Magna Charta.  It is the product of that 
same humane and enlightened public spirit which, speaking through our 
common-law, has decreed that every person charged with the commission of a 
crime shall be protected by the presumption of innocence until he has been 
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.162 
More recently, courts have equated the character evidence rule with the 
presumption of innocence.163 
The character evidence rule was formally embodied into FRE 404 by the 
United States Supreme Court in 1972 with the adoption of the Federal Rules of 
 
 159. Two important issues need to be raised at this point.  The character evidence ban is not 
absolute, and it does not apply to the parties equally.  The rule precluding evidence of the 
defendant’s character was limited to that evidence which would show the defendant acted in 
conformity with his character.  Therefore, exceptions were created to allow admission of evidence 
of the defendant’s character when it was either at issue in the dispute or if the evidence 
established something other than conformity with the character.  Secondly, the character evidence 
ban does not apply equally to the parties.  In a criminal case, the ban on character evidence 
generally does not include the character of the victim.  In fact, the rules allowed and encouraged 
the admission of the victim’s character.  The victim’s character has been and continues to be an 
important component of many trials, especially domestic violence trials.  See supra note 134 and 
accompanying text. 
 160. See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 141, at 1170 (citing SAMUEL MARCH PHILLIPPS, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 70 n.b (London, J. Butterworth & Son 1814)). 
 161. Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450 (1892). 
 162. People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 293-94 (N.Y. 1901). 
 163. United States v. Meyers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977). 
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Evidence.164  Contemporary commentators have traced the history of FRE 404 
and the ban on character.165  These commentators generally concur with 
Wigmore that the character evidence ban has been universally accepted in the 
United States since the time of the American Revolution.166  One scholar posits 
that the character evidence ban is “one of the oldest principles of Anglo-
American law” and that the “rule’s longevity can be measured in terms of 
centuries rather than only years or decades.”167  Another author writes: 
 
 164. The United States Supreme Court’s adoption of the rules of evidence in 1972 culminated 
nearly a dozen years of work on the issue.  In 1961, the Judicial Conference of the United States 
authorized Chief Justice Warren to study the feasibility of promulgating uniform rules of 
evidence.  After an initial study into whether uniform evidence rules were advisable, an advisory 
committee was appointed in 1965 to propose uniform rules.  By 1969, the committee submitted 
proposed rules for comments.  The Supreme Court adopted the rules in 1972, and Congress 
passed them in 1975.  See William L. Hungate,  Federal Rules of Evidence, H.R. Rep. No. 93-
650, at 2-3 (1973).  Interestingly, the process of developing the uniform rules occurred before the 
most significant advances of the Battered Women’s Movement.  Therefore, while the adoption of 
the uniform rules might have been an opportunity to address the appropriateness of FRE 404 in 
the domestic violence context, the model rule was adopted before the developments that began to 
question the impact of the rules of evidence. 
 165. Drew D. Dropkin & James H. McComas, Article, On a Collision Course: Pure 
Propensity Evidence and Due Process in Alaska, 18 ALASKA L. REV. 177, 179, 188-96 (2001); 
Leonard, supra note 141. 
 166. But see Karp, supra note 141, at 28 (discussing certain debates over ratification of the 
U.S. Constitution that included issues of character evidence).  Regarding the “same vicinage” 
requirement, Patrick Henry extolled the virtues of character evidence at trial: 
Will gentlemen tell me the trial by a jury of the vicinage where the party resides is 
preserved? . . . [T]his state . . . is so large that your juries may be collected five hundred 
miles from where the party resides – no neighbors who are acquainted with their 
characters, their good or bad conduct in life, to judge of the unfortunate man . . .  By the 
bill of rights of England, a subject has a  right to a trial by his peers.  What is meant by his 
peers?  Those who reside near him, his neighbors, and who are well acquainted with his 
character and situation in life.  Is this secured in the proposed plan before you?  No sir. 
III JONATHAN ELLIOT, ELLIOT’S DEBATES 578-79 (1836). 
 167. Leonard, supra note 141, at 1162-64.  Interestingly, political opposition to changes to the 
rule has sometimes led to exaggerated claims about the longevity of the character evidence rule.  
In 1994 President Bill Clinton signed into law the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement 
Act of 1994, which contained provisions that significantly changed Fed. R. Evid. 404 and created 
exceptions for admissibility of evidence of similar crimes in sexual assault and child molestation 
prosecutions.  Debra Sherman Tedeschi, Comment, Federal Rule of Evidence 413: Redistributing 
The Credibility Quotient, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 107, 108 (1995).  Senator Joseph Biden voiced 
opposition to the character evidence exceptions when he asserted that the rule had developed 
from “800 years . . . under our English jurisprudence system” and should not be changed by 
legislative action “to blind people to looking at the real facts before them and making an 
independent judgment.”  Id. at 119 (quoting 139 Cong. Rec. S15020-01, S15072 (daily ed. Nov. 
4, 1993) (statement of Sen. Biden)).  Based on other scholarly research, it seems safe to conclude 
that Senator Biden’s historical tracings of the character evidence rule can be relegated to the 
category of political hyperbole. 
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The historical evidence supporting exclusion of pure propensity evidence is 
compelling.  From the days of England’s Glorious Revolution until the present 
day, courts have demonstrated a steadfast commitment to the principle that 
pure propensity evidence should not be admitted, fearing that juries will infer 
present guilt from previous conduct.  Beginning in the late 1600s, courts in 
England – and eventually pre-colonial America as well – recognized the threat 
to fairness created by pure propensity evidence and sought to exclude it from 
criminal trials.  The principle has enjoyed longstanding status as a fundamental 
principle of American criminal justice.168 
C. Beyond Wigmore: Intellectual Foundations for the Character Evidence 
Rule 
Following Wigmore, it is possible to narrow the search for the intellectual 
foundations of the character evidence rule to the hundred years from the 
Restoration of the Stuarts in 1660 to the Declaration of Independence in 1776.  
However, to truly understand the intellectual foundations for the character 
evidence rule, one must move beyond Wigmore.  During this hundred year 
period, England and America experienced the birth of liberalism, the rise of 
modern science, the final rejection of virtue ethics, the development of the 
Enlightenment, and a breakdown in social stratification.169  It was in the 
cauldron of these five developments in intellectual history that the creation of 
 
 168. Dropkin, supra note 165, at 190-91. 
 169. Leonard argues that the historical, religious, and philosophical roots of the character 
evidence rule are the breakdown in social stratification due to industrialization and urbanization 
in England, the rise of Calvinism, and the moral philosophy of Kant.  See Leonard, supra note 
141, at 1193-1200.  While Leonard identified several important aspects, his treatment of even the 
important aspects is limited.  He failed to fully grasp the importance of the rise of science and the 
rejection of virtue ethics.  Leonard focuses on Calvinism and predestination.  In this, he misses 
the broader implications of the Reformation and the changing nature of the individual’s 
relationship to God, church, society, and the state.  Leonard also views the breakdown of social 
stratification as due to industrialization.  This misses the importance of the social and religious 
changes stemming from the Reformation.  In addition, Leonard fails to confine himself to the 
period of time during which the character evidence rule was established.  For example, Leonard 
relies on the writings of Kant.  Kant, however, wrote The Metaphysics of Morals in 1797, well 
after the establishment of the character evidence rule.  Also, Leonard cites to industrialization in 
America which did not occur until after the Civil War.  Again, this is long after the character 
evidence rule was adopted in American common law.  While industrialization in England did 
contribute to the breakdown of social hierarchy, it was but one factor.  Also, industrialization 
occurred long after the establishment of the rule.  In fact, Leonard cites to Weber who posits that 
industrialization was contingent upon the Protestant ethic.  Further, the breakdown of social 
stratification that occurred in America was not driven by industrialization.  Rather, it reflects the 
social and religious changes stemming from the Reformation.  For further explication, see infra 
notes 171-262 and accompanying text. 
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the character evidence ban was born and in context of which the character 
evidence ban makes intellectual sense.170 
1. The Birth of Liberalism 
When Wigmore spoke of the “liberal reaction which began with the 
Restoration of the Stuarts,”171 he was referring to the reign of Charles II which 
ran from 1660 to 1685.  In 1660, Charles II returned to the monarchy in 
England, ending the civil wars of the preceding hundred years and laying the 
groundwork for two major advances in intellectual history: the seeds of the 
liberal state and the rise of modern science. 
The roots of the liberal state can be evidenced in three aspects of Charles 
II’s reign.  First, as a condition of his return to power, Charles II issued the 
Declaration of Brea.172  Central to the Declaration of Brea was the agreement 
to guarantee liberty of conscience.173  In an attempt to end the political 
upheavals surrounding the wars of religion, Charles II advanced the notion of 
toleration of religious differences.174  This notion of tolerance gave birth to the 
separation of church and state.  As historian George Trevelyan noted: 
The division of the religious world into Church and Dissent made freedom of 
thought a possibility for the future.  The English could not be argued into 
toleration by their reason, but they could be forced into it by their feuds . . . .  
Thus the laws of the . . . Parliament [during Charles II’s reign] . . . have helped 
to secure freedom for a hundred religions, and a thousand ways of thought.175 
A second critical component of the developing liberal state was freedom of 
speech.  Prior to Charles II, freedom of speech, even in Parliament, had been 
curtailed.176  Charles II restored the freedom of speech within Parliament and 
the country.177 
Critics of Government policy can hardly be said to have had any liberty of 
person or speech guaranteed to them under the old Tudor and Stuart regime, 
except in the case of defined privileges, uncertainly enjoyed, within the walls 
of Parliament; but after the Restoration men no longer talked in whispers.178 
 
 170. The five developments are inter-related; for purposes of clarity, I discuss each 
individually. 
 171. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 128, § 194, at 415-16. 
 172. G.N. CLARK, THE LATER STUARTS: 1660-1714, at 3 (1934). 
 173. Id. 
 174. GODFREY DAVIES, THE EARLY STUARTS: 1603-1660, at 255 (1937). 
 175. GEORGE M. TREVELYAN, ENGLAND UNDER THE STUARTS 346 (1912).  See also 
WILLIAM CECIL DAMPIER, A HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND ITS RELATIONS WITH PHILOSOPHY AND 
RELIGION 109 (1966). 
 176. TREVELYAN, supra note 175, at 163-64. 
 177. Id. at 339. 
 178. Id. 
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The right of speech, particularly of dissent, was critical to the future of the 
liberal state.179 
Lastly, Charles II abolished the Star Chamber.180  The Star Chamber had 
been a special government court which punished political opponents of the 
King.  The judges in the Star Chamber were politicians, and they had 
extraordinary powers, unconstrained by the rules of procedure and evidence 
that existed in the ordinary courts.181  The abolition of the Star Chamber182 had 
three important impacts.  First, it contributed to the movement toward 
recognition of free speech.183  Second, the abolition recognized the importance 
of a separation between the executive and the judiciary.184  Lastly, the abolition 
advanced the belief that the law and the courts applied equally to all persons.185  
As Trevelyan notes, after the abolition of the Star Chamber, “The law of the 
land judged impartially all cases between officials and private citizens, and 
there was no longer a prerogative law and a special court to which Government 
could, as in other lands and in earlier times, appeal.”186 
Interestingly, it was these steps of Charles II’s which sowed the seeds for 
the birth of liberalism.  But, liberalism also grew out of the political upheavals 
surrounding the religious wars in Europe after the Reformation.187  Here, the 
aim was to justify the creation of a secular state that could coexist with 
divergent religious beliefs.  Toleration, freedom of individual choice, and the 
absence of a state-determined conception of the good life were critical 
components of liberalism. 188  On this view, liberalism has been defined as the 
 
 179. Id. at 346. 
 180. Id. at 339. 
 181. TREVELYAN, supra note 175, at 164-65. 
 182. Some scholars have observed that the ban on character evidence originated as a direct 
procedural response to the inquisitorial practices of the Star Chamber.  See Rice, supra note 4, at 
945 (citing Edward G. Mascolo, Uncharged-Misconduct Evidence and the Issue of Intent: 
Limiting the Need for Admissibility, 67 CONN. B.J. 281, 283-84 (1993)). 
 183. TREVELYAN, supra note 175, at 166. 
 184. Id.  “There could indeed be no more complete and dangerous example of merging the 
judiciary with the executive.”  Id. 
 185. CLARK, supra note 172, at 9. 
 186. TREVELYAN, supra note 175, at 339. 
 187. RUSSELL HARDIN, LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 41-42 (1999); 
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xxiv (1993). 
 188. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 1 (1982).  Sandel defines 
liberalism as the belief that: 
[S]ociety, being composed of a plurality of persons, each with his own aims, interests, and 
conceptions of the good, is best arranged when it is governed by principles that do not 
themselves presuppose any particular conception of the good; what justifies these 
regulative principles above all is not that they maximize the social welfare or otherwise 
promote the good, but rather that they conform to the concept of right, a moral category 
given prior to the good and independent of it. 
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shared public values that determine the fundamental terms of political and 
social cooperation.189  Liberalism is thus concerned with structuring state 
institutions to allow individuals the opportunity to flourish in individual 
ways.190  Primarily, liberalism demands that the government allow and protect 
individuals’ freedom of choice as to religious preference, social relations, and 
economic commitments.191 
Consistent with its historical foundations, liberalism in America 
incorporated the concept of separation of church and state, religious freedom 
and toleration, and freedom of speech.  In addition, the Constitution embodied 
both liberalism’s emphasis on protecting individual rights and the development 
of institutions that allow for personal freedom.192 
2. Rise of Modern Science 
The second lasting contribution of the reign of Charles II was his 
contribution to the birth of modern science.  In 1662, Charles II formed the 
Royal Society and lent state credibility and support to the organization.193  The 
Royal Society’s early members were Issac Newton,194 John Locke,195 and 
Robert Boyle,196 among others.197  As Peter Gay described: 
The Royal Society lived up to its name.  It held meetings to encourage 
scientific inquiry, engaged in correspondence in aid of the “new philosophy,” 
and reported on experiments, discoveries, and inventions in its famous 
publication, Philosophical Transactions.  Every prominent natural philosopher 
 
Id. (emphasis in original).  John Rawls defines a “conception of the good” as a “comprehensive 
doctrine.”  See RAWLS, supra note 187, at 13, 175.  For Rawls, a state-advanced conception of 
the good is synonymous with state policies that advance a comprehensive doctrine.  Id. at 223. 
 189. Linda McClain, Atomistic Man Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist 
Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171, 1205 (1992) (citing Rawls’s conceptions of liberalism). 
 190. HARDIN, supra note 187, at 1. 
 191. Id. at 6. 
 192. Goldfarb, supra note 67, at 34-35. 
 193. GEORGE H. DANIELS, SCIENCE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: A SOCIAL HISTORY 38 (1971); 
A. WOLF, A HISTORY OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE 16TH & 17TH 
CENTURIES 60 (1950).  The charter of the Royal Society called for the creation of society devoted 
to the pursuit of experimental knowledge.  Id.  For a general discussion of the role of the Royal 
Society in the “scientific colonization” of the American colonies, see DANIELS, supra, at 30-46. 
 194. CLARK, supra note 172, at 359.  Newton discovered the law of gravity and settled the 
main principles of mathematics, physics, astronomy, and optics once and for all.  Id. 
 195. Id. at 370-71.  Locke was a central figure in Enlightenment thought and published 
several works that were instrumental in the creation of the American Republic.  See 2 THE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 519 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967). 
 196. CLARK, supra note 172, at 360.  Boyle discovered “the relation between the volume, 
density, and pressure of gases,” commonly referred to as Boyle’s Law.  Boyle’s law was critical 
in the development of the steam engine.  Id. 
 197. Id. at 28-29. 
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in England belonged to it, and so did many distinguished scientists on the 
Continent.  So, too, did gifted amateurs like the diarist Samuel Pepys, the 
American clergyman Cotton Mather, and the American statesman-scientist 
Benjamin Franklin.  The list of its Fellows is a list of the leaders of the 
Scientific Revolution . . . .198 
The Royal Society in London was one of several scientific societies founded in 
the seventeenth century.199  These societies played a critical role in the 
development of modern science because they were not limited by the 
authorized epistemologies of either the universities or the churches.200  These 
societies contributed to an amazing breadth of fields, including astronomy, 
physics, anatomy, botany, mathematics, agriculture, social sciences, 
mechanics, electronics, chemistry, geology, medicine, textiles, mining, 
psychology, and geography.201 
The establishment of the Royal Society, and the other scientific societies, 
brought about the development of the scientific method.202  It was during this 
period of time that the “[s]pecial activity which we call scientific began to be a 
leading element in European thought.  That activity is one of unbiased inquiry, 
shrinking from no conclusion merely because it is unorthodox.  It is also 
positive and experimental: it tests its conclusions not only by reasoning but 
also by observation.”203  The scientific method is premised on the ability of 
individuals to observe the world through their own eyes and to interpret their 
observations using their own intelligence.204  Specifically, the scientific 
method emphasizes observation, experience, experiment, and a commitment to 
cause and effect.205  Importantly, the scientific method focused on how things 
worked rather than why things worked.206  The emphasis was on placing the 
item in its proper context within the physical world.207 
 
 198. PETER GAY, AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT 17 (1966). 
 199. WOLF, supra note 193, at 54-55.  The Accademia del Cimento was also founded in 
Florence in 1657 and the Academie des Sciences in Paris in 1666.  Id. at 8-9. 
 200. Id. at 54-55. 
 201. See generally id. 
 202. GAY, supra note 198, at 19-20.  Gay credits Isaac Newton with cementing the scientific 
method as the primary mode of inquiry of the Enlightenment and beyond.  Id. 
 203. CLARK, supra note 172, at 27.  See also L. W. H. HULL, HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF 
SCIENCE 194 (1965) (describing the scientific method as a “subtle blend of observation, 
hypothesis, mathematics and planned experiment”). 
 204. WOLF, supra note 193, at 54. 
 205. Id. at 4-5; see also GAY, supra note 198, at 20; HULL, supra note 203, at 191-195; Mark 
Cammack, In Search of the Post-Positivist Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 405, 412 (1995). 
 206. SIR WILLIAM CECIL DAMPIER, A HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND ITS RELATIONS WITH 
PHILOSOPHY & RELIGION 146 (1966). 
 207. Id. 
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An important aspect of the scientific method and the rise of modern 
science was the “secularization of knowledge.”208  Prior to the Reformation, 
knowledge, including science, was deemed to be divinely revealed by the 
Catholic Church.209  During the religious wars following the Reformation, 
many intellectuals became frustrated with the authoritarian positions of 
churches.  In addition, the concept of toleration undermined the position of the 
Catholic Church – or any church – as the sole source of knowledge.210  As a 
result, a growing number of individuals sought knowledge of the world 
through the use of reason, rather than divination.211  This process contributed 
to the general freedom of individuals to use reason to assess their own 
world.212 
As Treveleyan noted, the impact of the scientific movement reached far 
beyond science: 
The secular reaction among the libertines of life and politics at the capital 
would not have outlasted the generation that had suffered under Oliver 
[Cromwell], if it had not become joined to the more solid and respectable 
influence of a scientific movement springing up in the same time and place.  
The Royal Society was Royal in more than name . . . Charles II extended an 
intelligent patronage to science, when the time was ripe; bigotry could never 
exile nor years efface the native achievements of Newtonian discovery; while 
the idea of the rule of law in the universe slowly penetrated downwards from 
class to class, remoulding by unopposed and unsuspected influence the 
unconscious forms of thought, and even of religion itself.213 
Primarily because of the relationship between England and the American 
colonies, the impact of the scientific movement was strongly felt in America 
prior to the American Revolution.214  Many colonial Americans became 
members of the Royal Society of London.215  In addition, several scientific 
societies, such as the American Philosophical Society, were founded in the 
 
 208. WOLF, supra note 193, at 8. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id.; see also GAY, supra note 198, at 31 (asserting that the “claim of Christianity to be 
the one true faith was thrown into doubt” by the secularizing impact of global exploration and 
greater interaction with non-Western civilizations). 
 211. WOLF, supra note 193, at 8; see also GAY, supra note 198, at 31, 40 (discussing how a 
greater number of religious leaders themselves employed “rational inquiry” to examine the 
history of religion). 
 212. HULL, supra note 203, at 185.  “Men began to see that by applying their own intelligence 
they might make for themselves an oracle wiser and less capricious than that of Delphi, and so 
command their fate more fully than ever before.”  Id. 
 213. TREVELYAN, supra note 175, at 347. 
 214. DANIELS, supra note 193, at 47. 
 215. Id. at 50. 
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fledgling colonies.216  Benjamin Franklin stated that the purpose of the 
Philosophical Society was to “let light into the nature of things and tend to 
increase the power of man over matter, and multiply the conveniences or 
pleasures of life.”217  The American scientific societies modeled themselves 
after their British counterparts and dedicated themselves to the scientific 
method.218  The language of the Declaration of Independence emphasizes the 
extent to which the notions of individual use of reason had permeated 
American thought.219 
After the War of Independence, American commitment to scientific 
inquiry redoubled.220  Many Americans emphasized the connection between 
freedom from England and intellectual freedom: 
[The] introduction and progress of freedom have generally attended the 
introduction and progress of letters and science.  In despotick governments the 
people are mostly illiterate, rude, and uncivilized; but in states where civil 
liberty hath been cherished, the human mind hath generally proceeded in 
improvement, – learning and knowledge have prevailed, and the arts and 
sciences have flourished.221 
 
 216. Id. at 66-68, 106-07 (discussing the various efforts to establish scientific societies in 
America prior to the Revolution, particular the American Philosophical Society). 
 217. Id. at 106. 
 218. Id. at 107. 
 219. “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and 
the pursuit of Happiness.”  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).  See also, 
SIMON BLACKBURN, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 120 (1994).  This is also an 
example of the extent to which the ideals of the Enlightenment were incorporated into America.  
See infra notes 222-34 and accompanying text. 
 220. DANIELS, supra note 193, at 126-27. 
 221. Id. at 128 (quoting John Gardiner). 
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3. Enlightenment Philosophy 
The Age of Enlightenment is generally considered to have started in the 
late seventeenth century and run into the middle of the nineteenth century.  
Some historians mark the beginning of the Enlightenment with Isaac Newton 
publishing the Principia Mathematica in 1687,222 others with the adoption of 
the Bill of Rights following the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England.223  A 
detailed discussion of the complexities of the Enlightenment is beyond the 
scope of this article.224  However, there are several ideas which run 
consistently through much of Enlightenment thought and which found 
prominence in colonial and revolutionary America. 
Enlightenment thinkers believed in the existence of an objective truth or 
reality.225  They asserted the preeminence of the rational mind226 and 
committed themselves to the discovery of the objective truth through the 
rigorous use of the rational mind, including the scientific method of 
observation and attention to cause and effect.227  The belief in a discoverable 
objective reality, coupled with the breakdown of the status society,228 led to the 
notion that people should be judged by their actions and not their position held 
as an accident of birth. 
In addition, the Enlightenment was characterized by optimism about 
human nature and its possibilities.229  Enlightenment thinkers viewed people as 
essentially good and able to use their reason to advance themselves and society 
toward greater equality and liberty.230  This optimism is evident in the 
 
 222. GAY, supra note 198, at 12. 
 223. ROY PORTER, THE CREATION OF THE MODERN WORLD: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE 
BRITISH ENLIGHTENMENT 27 (2000). 
 224. Much has been written about the history of the Enlightenment.  Indeed, it is facetious to 
suggest that there is one thing called the Enlightenment.  The ideas proposed are varied and often 
contradictory. 
 225. Cammack, supra note 205, at 411-12. 
 226. The Enlightenment advanced the idea that the individual could make their own inquiries 
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Jackson and Sean Doran, Evidence, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL 
THEORY 172 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996). 
 227. STEVEN BEST & DOUGLAS KELLNER, POSTMODERN THEORY: CRITICAL 
INTERROGATIONS 2 (1991). 
The theoretical discourses of modernity from Descartes through the Enlightenment and its 
progeny championed reason as the source of progress in knowledge and society, as well 
as the privileged locus of truth and the foundation of systematic knowledge.  Reason was 
deemed competent to discover adequate theoretical and practical norms upon which 
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Id. 
 228. See infra notes 250-61 and accompanying text. 
 229. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 195, at 521. 
 230. See id. at 519. 
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commitment to the use of reason and the individual’s ability to discern that 
objective truth.  In fact, the Enlightenment has been described as a 
“metaphysics of the ‘sound common sense.’”231 
According to Enlightenment thinkers, the ability of every human being to 
fully employ his or her reason had been constrained by the forces of church, 
state, social and economic class, superstition, ignorance, and prejudice.232  One 
of the objectives of the Enlightenment was to clear these obstacles from the 
individual’s path toward realization of each person’s full potential, primarily 
through education.233  Importantly, the Enlightenment viewed progress of both 
the individual and society as virtually unlimited.234 
4. The Rejection of Virtue Ethics 
Prior to the Reformation in Europe, the concept of morality – deeming an 
action to be appropriate or inappropriate235 – derived primarily from the Greek 
notion of virtue.236  Aristotle defined virtue as “state involving rational choice, 
consisting in a mean relative to us and determined by reason – the reason, that 
is, by reference to which the practically wise person would determine it.”237  
Virtue included the concept of an individual’s character, but it also embraced 
an individual’s role in a hierarchical social structure.238  To be virtuous was to 
perform a particular and specific function within society: a king had certain 
virtues – for instance, an ability to command – that were contingent on his 
place in society.239  A person’s character, therefore, was a function of his or her 
allotted role in society, be it king, soldier, or wife, and not of their decisions or 
actions.  Greek society was rigidly hierarchical.240  An individual’s role in 
Greek society was permanently established by his or her nature at birth.  The 
social setting into which one was born determined one’s social function, one’s 
 
 231. 2 WILHELM WINDELBAND, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY: RENAISSANCE, 
ENLIGHTENMENT, AND MODERN 438 (1958). 
 232. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 195, at 520. 
 233. Id. at 521. 
 234. Id. 
 235. I use the terms appropriate and inappropriate to avoid the difficulties of the term “good” 
and “bad.”  Also, appropriate and inappropriate allow for comparison of pre-Reformation 
morality based on virtue ethics and post-Reformation morality based on individual psychology. 
 236. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS: A HISTORY OF MORAL 
PHILOSOPHY FROM THE HOMERIC AGE TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 8 (2d ed. 1998). 
 237. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book II, ch. 6 (Roger Crisp ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2000). 
 238. MACINTYRE, supra note 236, at 8. 
 239. Id. 
 240. See infra text accompanying notes 250-62 (discussing the transformation of American 
society from hierarchical monarchism to republicanism and democracy). 
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position in relation to superior and inferior persons, and one’s obligations and 
duties to superiors.241 
The Greek notion of virtue survived the rise of Christianity; indeed, it was 
incorporated into Christianity primarily through the theology of Aquinas.242  
Western Europe, therefore: 
[I]nherited from the Greeks and from Christianity a moral vocabulary in which 
to judge an action good was to judge it to be the action of a good man, and to 
judge a man good was to judge him as manifesting dispositions (virtues) which 
enabled him to play a certain kind of role in a certain kind of social life.243 
The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries brought a radical transformation 
in the understanding of virtue, morality, and character.244  With the advent of 
the Reformation and capitalism, the relationship of the individual to society 
experienced significant changes.245  Reformation thought insisted on personal 
judgment and individual responsibility regarding one’s relationship to God, as 
opposed to strict obedience to ecclesiastical authority.246  As a consequence of 
greater individualism, people sought a morality, not based on the dictates of 
Christianity but based on reason and experience.247 
In addition to changes in the relationship of the individual to the church, 
society itself underwent significant structural changes.  Rigid social hierarchy 
began to break down, and with it the traditional ties of duty and obligation 
were “fatally loosened.”248  Individuals experienced greater personal 
autonomy.  This transformation led to: 
[A] move from the well-defined simplicities of the morality of role fulfillment, 
where we judge a man as farmer, as king, as father, to the point at which 
evaluation has become detached, both in the vocabulary and in practice, from 
roles, and we ask not what it is to be good at or for this or that role or skill, but 
just what it is to be “a good man”; not what it is to do one’s duty as clergyman 
or landowner, but as “a man.”249 
As a result of these changes, individuals felt freer to determine for 
themselves the appropriateness or inappropriateness of a particular action.  
This determination rested more on resonance with personal experience and 
 
 241. See MACINTYRE, supra note 236, at 8, 156. 
 242. Id. at 117. 
 243. Id. at 166. 
 244. Id. at 156. 
 245. Id. at 167. 
 246. HENRY SIDGWICK, OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF ETHICS FOR ENGLISH READERS 153-
54 (1949). 
 247. Id. at 157. 
 248. MACINTYRE, supra note 236, at 156.  This transformation is more fully explored infra at 
notes 250-62 and accompanying text. 
 249. MACINTYRE, supra note 236, at 94 (emphasis in original). 
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individual reason than on religious doctrine.  The resulting rejection of a 
virtue-based objective value system generated a pluralism of moral belief and 
the inability of individuals to agree as to which settled dispositions should be 
considered “virtuous.”  Moreover, with the focus turned to individual 
autonomy, not surprisingly the focus of morality turned to action rather than 
disposition. 
5. The Breakdown of Social Stratification 
The period of time between 1660 and the creation of the American 
republic saw a dramatic change in the nature of English and American 
societies: the transition from monarchy to democracy.250  This transition 
completely changed the relationships of individuals to each other and to the 
state. 
The Restoration of the Stuarts in 1660 was a restoration of the monarchy in 
England.  In addition, it was an extension of the traditional social hierarchy.251  
English monarchical society was rigidly hierarchical.252  There were no 
modern conceptions of the separation between society and state, or public and 
private.253  The divine right of kings established a direct link from God to the 
king.254  The king was the head of the state, the church, and the society, and all 
owed allegiance to the king.255  As David Hume wrote, monarchy was “a long 
 
 250. Contrary to popular belief, the breakdown in social hierarchy took place primarily 
without industrialization, particularly in America.  WOOD, supra note 52, at 7. 
 251. TREVELYAN, supra note 175, at 332-33. 
 252. See DAVIES, supra note 174, at 264-72 (discussing the hierarchy of royalty, nobility, 
country gentry, landlords, and tenants that existed in England prior to the restoration of Charles 
II).  Davies explains how the concept of “paternal rule” was commonplace and founded on 
dependence of tenants.  Id. at 266.  See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *396-407.  Blackstone 
details the division of the society into nobility and commonality.  Id. at 396.  He further 
graphically represents this division with a “Table of Precedence,” which goes from the king’s 
children to laborers.  Id. at 405-06. 
 253. WOOD, supra note 52, at 81. 
 254. ROSS HARRISON, HOBBES, LOCKE, AND CONFUSION’S MASTERPIECE: AN 
EXAMINATION OF SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 2-4 (2003).  Harrison cites 
to speeches of James I from 1610, in which he stated that “Kings are justly called gods, for that 
they exercise a manner or resemblance of divine power upon earth.”  Id. at 2.  Blackstone 
disputed that there was a divine right of kings.  He felt that the rights of the kings were inherited.  
See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *191. 
 255. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *366-67.  “Allegiance is the tie, or ligament, which 
binds the subject to the king, in return for that protection which the king affords the subject”  Id.  
See also WOOD, supra note 52, at 11-12 (discussing that the king was the head of the nation and 
that to be a subject was to be “personally subordinated to a paternal dominion”). 
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train of dependence from the prince to the peasant.”256  Inherent within 
hierarchy is inequality.257 
As has already been discussed, one of the consequences of the 
Reformation was that the need for an intermediary between the individual and 
God was challenged.  After the Reformation, individuals were free to make 
their own relationship to God.  This not only affected the role of the church in 
society, it also affected the position of the monarchy.  The impact on the 
monarchy was furthered by those same efforts which gave birth to liberalism, 
namely the recognition of religious toleration, freedom of conscience, freedom 
of speech, and the separation of church and state:258 
Among the monarchies of Europe, the English possessed by far the most 
republican constitution . . . .  Already by the beginning of the [eighteenth] 
century the English monarchy had lost much of its sacred aura.  The man-made 
dynastic alterations of 1688 and 1714 and the rationalizing of religion 
inevitably weakened the sense of hereditary mystique, and the restrictions 
Parliament placed on the crown’s prerogatives and finances diminished the 
king’s ability to act independently.259 
The gradual replacement of monarchy with republicanism: 
challenged the primary assumptions and practices of monarchy – its hierarchy, 
its inequality, its devotion to kinship, its patriarchy, its patronage, and its 
dependency.  It offered new conceptions of the individual, the family, the state, 
and the individual’s relationship to the family, the state, and other individuals.  
Indeed, republicanism offered nothing less than new ways of organizing 
society.  It defied and dissolved the older monarchical connections and 
presented people with alternative kinds of attachments, new sorts of social 
relationships.  It transformed monarchical culture and prepared the way for the 
revolutionary upheavals at the end of the eighteenth century.260 
This transition from hierarchy to a more egalitarian society was most 
dramatic in America.  Colonial society was largely hierarchical.261  During the 
American Revolution, republican ideals had permeated American society and 
the Revolution contributed to the replacement of hierarchy with egalitarianism, 
inherited status with ability, and stratification with an ideal of upward mobility 
and individual self-fulfillment.262 
 
 256. David Hume, The Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences, in DAVID HUME’S 
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 257. WOOD, supra note 52, at 19. 
 258. See supra text accompanying notes 171-92. 
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 260. Id. at 96-97. 
 261. Lerner, supra note 51, at 127 (discussing the particular impact of this hierarchical 
structure on women and their resulting position of inferiority and subordination). 
 262. Id. 
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D. Manifestations of These Intellectual Developments within the Rule 
The birth of liberalism, the Enlightenment, the rise of modern science, the 
rejection of virtue ethics, and the breakdown of social stratification all 
occurred during the hundred years from 1660 to 1776.  In light of this history, 
it is not surprising that this same time period witnessed dramatic shifts in the 
nature of criminal trials, changed conceptions about the role of juries, and the 
establishment of the character evidence rule.  Although a discussion of these 
broader social and intellectual changes is missing from the cases establishing 
the character evidence rule, it is possible to observe aspects of all five of the 
major developments in the rule itself, particularly as the rule is established in 
America. 
The philosophies of the Enlightenment played a significant role in the 
creation of the American republic and informed much of the ideology 
surrounding the American Revolution.263  The character evidence rule 
embodies Enlightenment philosophy’s emphasis on objective truth and its 
corresponding rejection of a person’s private character as an important aspect 
of legal decision-making.264  The scientific movement’s emphasis on 
observable action265 and the Reformation’s emphasis on the ability of the 
individual to independently determine the significance of an action266 are also 
reflected in the rule.  Finally, the character evidence rule reflects important 
concepts of liberalism. 
Manifestations of Enlightenment thought can be found throughout the 
political and intellectual history of Europe and the United States.  Those ideals, 
however, found particularly fertile soil in the United States.  Indeed, 
Enlightenment ideas fostered significant aspects of the American 
Revolution.267  For example, the rejection of the importance of private 
character as evidenced by social position and social stratification was central to 
the American Revolution and the radical nature of the American experiment.268  
At the same time, the Enlightenment emphasized scientific observation of the 
objective world.269  Here are the early seeds of the emerging conception of a 
separation between public action and private character. 
Significantly, these concepts found their way into the American jury trial 
and were important in transforming the trial from an exploration of the 
character of the parties to an objective search for the truth regarding the 
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parties’ actions.270  In fact, it was the legal system’s adoption of the 
Enlightenment’s focus on the objective that led to the modern conception of a 
trial. 271  Prior to the Enlightenment, jury trials consisted primarily of the 
production of witnesses to swear to the character of the parties.  The trial was 
not about the facts of the dispute; rather, it focused on demonstration of good 
character of the parties.272  The pre-Reformation conception of trials was, of 
course, consistent with pre-Reformation virtue ethics. 
The modern trial mimics several of the Enlightenment’s central tenets.  
First, the trial can be seen as a rational search for the truth based upon the 
observation of objective facts.273  In addition, the trial reflects an 
Enlightenment optimism in the ability of the jury to achieve that truth.274  The 
significant aspect of this is that certain types of proof were deemed appropriate 
for sound and just decision-making, and others were not.275  Thus, the rules of 
evidence developed to protect the process of the trial from being subverted by 
inappropriate methods of proof. 276  The preclusion of hearsay and methods of 
authentication of documents are two such examples.  The trial, as guided by 
the developing rules of evidence, sought to focus on the objective truth 
discernible through “scientific” methods.277 
The ban on character evidence, with its corresponding shift from the 
subjective to the objective, was one of the most significant rules of evidence in 
 
 270. Leonard, supra note 141, at 1194-96. 
 271. See id. at 1195-96. 
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the development of the modern, “enlightened” trial.278  Precluding the very 
evidence that formed the basis of verdicts prior to the Enlightenment reflects 
the impact of the rejection of virtue ethics and the completeness of the 
adoption of these ideas in the common law, both British and American. 
It is not surprising that during this period, juries underwent a profound 
change.  Prior to the 1660s, jurors could be required to return verdicts for the 
Crown.279  In fact, the Star Chamber was often used to prosecute and punish 
jurors who failed to return verdicts favorable to the Crown.280  Because the 
Crown was the agent of God, the juror simply followed the word of God, in a 
similar fashion to the way that knowledge in general was conveyed and 
understood.  After the Reformation and the rise of modern science and secular 
knowledge, individuals no longer needed intermediaries to understand or 
interpret information.  Individuals were able to use their own experience and 
intelligence to determine their relationship to God, to the world, and to 
knowledge.  Not surprisingly, these changes were reflected in the way juries 
functioned.  In 1670, the courts officially recognized the right of jurors to act 
independently and to use their own judgment and intelligence in reaching a 
verdict.281  In Bushell’s Case, the court eloquently expressed the extent to 
which the impact of the Reformation and the scientific movement had 
influenced jury trials: 
To what end must [jurors] undergo the heavy punishment of the villainous 
judgment, if after all this they implicitly must give a verdict by the dictates and 
authority of another man, under pain of fines and imprisonment, when sworn 
to do it according to the best of their own knowledge?  A man cannot see by 
another’s eye, nor hear by another’s ear, no more can a man conclude or infer 
the thing to be resolved by another’s understanding or reasoning.282 
At the same time that jurors were free to act with independent judgment, 
the character evidence rule developed to keep a particular type of evidence 
from jurors.  While at first glance contradictory, this development is consistent 
with the liberal principles being developed during the end of the seventeenth 
and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries. 
Liberalism, particularly in America, came to be synonymous with personal 
autonomy and procedural fairness.283  Personal autonomy is consistent with the 
concept of individual freedom in the exercise of rights guaranteed to the 
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individual by the state.284  It is possible to view personal autonomy as a private 
realm shielded from intrusion by the state within which the individual is free to 
make choices about how to live.  Procedural fairness, on the other hand, is 
more focused on the interaction of the individual with the state; in other words, 
with the public actions of the individual in relation to the shared rules of 
cooperation enforced by the state.285  Liberalism’s concern with both personal 
autonomy and procedural fairness can also be expressed as the creation of a 
public-private dichotomy.286 
With regard to procedural fairness, the resolution of public disputes is of 
primary concern.287  A public dispute is one involving the individual and the 
government or a breach of the social order.  The resolution of public disputes is 
critical to regulating interactions between individuals and in preserving the 
realms of personal autonomy.  It is due to the unique nature of American 
liberal society that nearly all disputes of public importance are resolved in 
court, usually by means of a trial.  The trial is one of the main vehicles by 
which liberalism is manifest in the legal arena; it is the means by which 
American society determines mens rea and the objective failure to live up to 
the requirements of social cooperation.  Consistent with the definition of 
liberalism discussed above, the trial must not advance a particular conception 
of the good; rather, the trial must be a forum for formal decision-making 
regulated by rules that ensure the neutrality of the forum in its determination of 
the facts. 
 
 284. Id. at 34. 
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 286. While the concept of privacy implicit in such a public-private dichotomy did not fully 
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Liberalism distinguishes between spheres of public concern – our actions that affect others – and 
spheres of private action – those actions over which we should have autonomous control and in 
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 287. See MACINTYRE, supra note 236, at 157.  “Disputes between men have no impartial 
arbiter to decide them, and every dispute will therefore tend toward a state of war between the 
parties.  All these considerations make desirable the handing over of authority to a civil power in 
who trust can be reposed.”  Id. 
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To ensure the neutrality of the forum, the rules must preserve two separate 
aspects of neutrality.  First, the rules must protect the procedural neutrality of 
the forum by eliminating improper advantage based on influence, status, or 
standing.  Second, the rules must ensure the evidentiary neutrality of the 
forum.  This second aspect is primarily achieved through the exercise of the 
rules of evidence that regulate the types of evidence deemed appropriate for 
substantive decision making.  The rules of evidence, therefore, are essential to 
the public aspect of liberalism: they regulate a formal and reasonable decision 
making process which seeks, so far as possible, a substantively just result. 
As a subset of the evidence rules, the character evidence rule advances the 
liberal conception of procedural fairness through the preservation of 
evidentiary neutrality.  However, it also embodies an additional component of 
liberalism.  The rule mimics the public-private dichotomy inherent in 
liberalism; it reflects the liberal belief that what is done in the private realm of 
personal autonomy is not relevant to the public sphere.  The rule not only 
regulates formal decision-making, it reinforces the essence of liberalism: 
freedom of individual choice to be the sort of person one wants to be, limited 
by the objective terms of cooperation. 
The notion that people should be judged by their public actions and not 
their private character is quintessentially American, quintessentially 
Enlightenment, and quintessentially American liberalism: 
The trial can and should be a model for formal decision making.  The types of 
evidence we find acceptable in that setting should represent our highest, not 
our lowest, instincts about how we ought to behave.  If we believe that we 
should avoid making decisions based on character, then the trial process should 
reinforce that belief through regulation of character evidence.288 
The trial reflects liberalism’s belief that a fair set of procedures will result in a 
fair determination: justice.  Excluding character evidence reflects the notion 
that character evidence will pervert the procedures in the trial.  It also reflects a 
belief that the private realm is not relevant to the resolution of public disputes.  
Under this theory, the character evidence rule is critical to creating and 
preserving a fair procedure for formal decision making. 
E. A New Rule Is Consistent with Intellectual Foundations of Rule 
In the domestic violence context, the character evidence rule, however, 
violates its intellectual foundations, and therefore, the rule’s legitimate 
purposes.  The rule rejects Enlightenment and scientific principles and violates 
the essence of liberalism by advancing a particular conception of the good.  An 
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examination of these violations compels a new rule true to the principles 
underlying the original rule. 
1. Traditional Policy Arguments Are Unpersuasive 
The traditional policy arguments in favor of the character evidence rule are 
not persuasive in the context of a modern domestic violence trial.289  The 
concern over unfair surprise has largely been addressed by procedural rules 
requiring notice of the charges and pre-trial recitation of all prior bad act 
evidence.290  The claim that a person will have to defend against his whole life 
is exaggerated.  The defendant is aware of his past and aware that the only 
relevant portion of his past is that which relates to violence against women.  
Because the prosecution is limited in its knowledge of the defendant’s private 
life, its main source of information comes from prior police reports and from 
the victim.  Prior police reports are readily accessible to both the prosecution 
and the defense.  The victim is generally subjected to a grueling interview with 
the defense prior to trial, during which the defense is free to investigate prior 
instances of violence of which the victim knows.  In addition, the prosecution 
is under a continuing duty to provide pre-trial discovery and therefore must 
inform the defense of any acts of misconduct which the prosecution intends to 
present.291  Finally, the question of whether a prior bad act is admissible can be 
established pre-trial.  The concept of unfair surprise does not exist in the 
typical domestic violence trial today. 
 
 289. It is interesting to compare the domestic violence context with the sexual assault context.  
Congress rejected the traditional policy arguments when it enacted rules admitting prior 
misconduct in sexual assault and child molestation cases.  See FED. R. EVID. 413-15.  There is 
much scholarly work which supports the rejection of the traditional policy arguments in the 
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assault context because of the repetitive nature of domestic violence within a single relationship. 
 290. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (requiring “reasonable notice in advance of trial”); FED. R. CRIM. 
P. 12(b)(3)(c) (requiring pre-trial motion to suppress evidence); FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2 (requiring 
production of witness statements for pre-trial motion to suppress).  In addition, this concern has 
been rejected in the sexual assault context.  See supra note 289. 
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The concerns over undue prejudice and confusion of the issues are also 
largely addressed by the availability of pre-trial determinations and the 
interaction of FRE 404 and FRE 403.292  Prior to any character evidence 
getting before a jury, the judge has to determine that the probative value of the 
evidence substantially outweighs the prejudice to the defendant.  During the 
pre-trial hearing, all of the character evidence is discussed, and the parties 
argue its relevance, prejudicial nature, and probative value.  In addition, 
restrictions on the evidence that will be admitted are fully argued and 
established long before the jury sees or hears the evidence. 
While a pre-trial hearing and a judicial determination go a long way to 
undermining the assertion of undue prejudice and confusion of the issues, there 
is no question that juries may misuse evidence.  There is also no question that a 
jury feels more comfortable and confident in its decision of guilt when they are 
aware of a past history of violence.  Of course, the converse is also true.  
Without a past history, juries are apt to discount the allegations and consider 
the victim not credible.  Without a past history, juries will only see the bad acts 
of the victim in isolation.  Given this fact, it seems disingenuous to act as if the 
trial is not about character.  What the trial is not about is the character of the 
defendant.293 
2. The Current Rule Never Contemplated Domestic Violence 
As detailed above, the character evidence ban was well established in the 
American common law before the American Revolution.  Domestic violence 
has been expressly or tacitly sanctioned since the formation of the United 
States.  The character evidence rule, therefore, was established at a time when 
the legal position of women was subordinate to men, and it was legal for a 
husband to beat his wife. 
Overlapping the history of the character evidence rule with the history of 
domestic violence highlights several significant issues and calls into question 
the continued validity of the character evidence rule in the domestic violence 
context.  The character evidence rule developed to deal with specific sets of 
problems relating to character and the effort to achieve fair trials and just 
verdicts.  Because domestic violence was not a crime, the unique issues 
 
 292. FED. R. EVID. 403 states: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded it its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation 
of cumulative evidence.” 
 293. Alaska, Colorado, Minnesota, and California have adopted evidence rules which admit 
prior acts of domestic violence in the current prosecution.  See ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(4) 
(2001); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-801.5(2) (2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 634.20 (2001); and 
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1109(a)(1) (1999).  As with the changes in the federal sexual assault arena, 
no scholarly work identifies great injustices that have resulted from these changes. 
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surrounding domestic violence were not considered in the set of problems that 
the character evidence rule was developed to address. 294  The character 
evidence rule should, therefore, reflect changed understandings.295 
3. The Current Rule Violates Liberal Theory 
The character evidence rule embodies liberalism’s concern with the 
preservation of personal autonomy and the neutrality of formal decision-
making.  In the domestic violence context, however, the character evidence 
ban subverts its liberal principles and distorts the neutral process into one that 
advances a particular conception of the good or comprehensive doctrine.296 
In a non-domestic violence case, the character evidence rule can be 
supported by arguments not derived from a comprehensive doctrine.  The rule 
applies equally to all and advances the belief that character evidence is not 
relevant to a determination of our public actions.297  When accused of a crime, 
being judged by our actions and not by our character does not seem to foster a 
particular conception of the good or a religious viewpoint. 298  Rather, the rule 
assists in the discovery of truth by preserving a fair and neutral dispute 
resolution forum, primarily through the regulation of evidence deemed to be 
prejudicial to the issues.  In the non-domestic violence context, the character 
evidence rule furthers its liberal principles. 
In the specific context of domestic violence, however, the arguments in 
favor of the rule are made from a comprehensive doctrine that promotes the 
subordinate position of women.  This violates a central tenet of liberalism that 
the state cannot encourage a comprehensive doctrine or a particular conception 
of the good.  The character evidence rule profoundly disadvantages women.  
 
 294. Seymore, supra note 23, at 1035. 
 295. In light of the history of domestic violence, commentators’ reliance on the longevity of 
the character evidence rule as support for the rule’s continued existence is questionable.  See 
generally Leonard supra note 141. 
 296. I borrow the term “comprehensive doctrine” from John Rawls.  Rawls defines a doctrine 
as “comprehensive when it includes conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals of 
personal character, as well as ideals of friendship and of familial and associational relationships, 
and much else that is to inform our conduct, and in the limit to our life as a whole.”  RAWLS, 
supra note 187, at 13, 175. 
 297. According to Rawls, justice can only be achieved when state policies – i.e. judicial 
decisions – are not based on a comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrines.  Id. at 223. 
 298. It is interesting to note that Leonard, supra note 141, makes several arguments for the 
continued existence of the character evidence rules, in the general context, expressly relying on 
comprehensive doctrines.  He states that the rule embodies the Jewish principle of loshan hora 
(literally, evil tongue).  Id. at 1188, 1190-91.  Later, Leonard discusses the Protestant basis for the 
rule.  Id. at 1196-99.  These arguments would violate liberalism’s prohibition against 
comprehensive doctrines. 
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Women comprise the overwhelming majority of domestic violence victims.299  
For these women, the rule prevents discussion of their realities and allows male 
defendants to hide behind half-truths of good character.  Male defendants are 
allowed to define the relationship and – through the character evidence rule – 
are permitted to employ and profit from societal stereotypes about women in 
general and domestic violence victims in particular.  This distorts the trial and 
subverts liberalism’s goal of preserving evidentiary neutrality. 
The character evidence rule also plays a significant role in preserving the 
private sphere which perpetuates the subordinate legal and cultural status of 
women.  As discussed earlier, the private sphere has been primary in 
perpetuating male domestic violence against women.  This is state sanctioned 
violation of women’s personal autonomy.  Whether supported by secular or 
religious beliefs, the comprehensive doctrine of patriarchy underlies the 
character evidence rule.300 
When the rule was originally adopted, the subordinate status of women 
meant that the underpinnings of the rule were ones that a person could 
reasonably expect others to embrace.301  That is no longer the case.  It is 
inconceivable that a person could reasonably expect others to embrace a rule 
that treats women as subordinate, that hides the true nature of domestic 
violence, that so disproportionately advantages men, that perpetuates violence 
against women, and that allows juries to base their decisions on biases, 
falsehoods, and stereotypes.  It is not reasonable to assume that others would 
accept these arguments in favor of the continued existence of the character 
evidence rules in the domestic violence context.302 
4. The Current Rule Violates Enlightenment and Scientific Principles 
In the domestic violence context, the current rule violates the principles of 
the Enlightenment and the scientific movement.  As discussed above, the 
Enlightenment and the scientific movement constituted rejections of virtue 
ethics and religious superstition.  Rather than focusing on the character of 
individuals as birthrights and authorized epistemologies, the Enlightenment 
 
 299. Rice, supra note 4, at 939-40. 
 300. For a general discussion of patriarchy and liberalism, see Jonathan Kahn, Privacy as a 
Legal Principle of Identity Maintenance, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 371, 389-92 (2003); Schneider, 
Equal Rights, supra note 2, at 628.  For a general discussion of patriarchy and its historical roots, 
see GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY (1986). 
 301. See RAWLS, supra note 187, at 243.  Rawls defines a legitimate governmental policy as 
one that “all might reasonably be expected to endorse.”  Id. 
 302. Id. at 226.  “There is no reason why any citizen, or association of citizens, should have 
the right to use state power to decide constitutional essentials as that person’s, or that 
association’s, comprehensive doctrine directs.  When equally represented, no citizen could grant 
to another person or association that political power.”  Id. 
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and the scientific movement emphasized individual reason and freedom of 
conscience: individuals can employ their own reason to discern the objective 
truth about an action.303 
The character evidence rule represents an acceptance of the Enlightenment 
insight that a person’s private character is irrelevant in assessing a person’s 
public actions.  This public-private dichotomy was critical to the establishment 
of the modern jury trial and American rejection of a status-based society.  
Many people would view these developments as significant advances in the 
history of humanity, especially as they paved the way for democratic 
governance with all the accompanying principles of liberalism: liberty; 
equality; privacy; and freedom of religion, thought, and speech.304  These 
changes reflected the Enlightenment belief in the essential goodness of persons 
and of the need for increased equality between persons. 
The character evidence rule also reflects an acceptance of objective 
evidence of actions.  It incorporates a fundamental insight of the scientific 
movement that the meaning of an action is contingent upon understanding the 
context surrounding the action.  Observation, experience, and experiment are 
all geared toward placing an action in context.  After the rise of modern 
science and the Enlightenment, an individual did not need to rely on a higher 
power to determine the importance of an action. 
In the non-domestic violence context, the character evidence rule’s 
extension of the public-private dichotomy furthers greater equality and 
egalitarianism.  The rule reduces aspects of social status or advantage from 
influencing the jury’s determination.  The rule advances the notion that all are 
equal regardless of birth or social status.  It also furthers scientific principles in 
that the rule removes from the jury’s consideration evidence not connected to 
the act or its context.  In this way, the character evidence rule advances its 
underlying principles. 
In the domestic violence context, however, the rule violates its underlying 
principles and fails to serve its objective evidence role.  First, the character 
evidence rule systematically misrepresents the equal importance of the 
interests of one group (women) over another (men).  Rather than advancing 
Enlightenment principles of egalitarianism, the rule perpetuates the subordinate 
position of women.  The character evidence rule perpetuates the public-private 
dichotomy, preserves a private realm of violence against women, and shields 
that private violence from public scrutiny.  In the domestic violence context, 
therefore, the character evidence rule works to perpetuate greater subjugation 
rather than less. 
 
 303. Jackson & Doran, supra note 226, at 172. 
 304. Goldfarb, supra note 67, at 39. 
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Second, the character evidence rule isolates an act of domestic violence 
from the context of the violent relationship.  This is contrary to current 
understanding of battering relationships as a pattern of behavior and not a 
series of isolated incidents.  As discussed earlier, viewing an act separated 
from its context changes the meaning of the act for both the victim and the 
jury.  Denying a juror’s ability to place the violent act into its proper and full 
context prevents the juror from employing the scientific principles that formed 
the character evidence rule.  Essentially, the juror is prevented from using her 
own reason and experience to make an objective assessment of the defendant’s 
action.  The use of the character evidence rule, therefore, violates this 
understanding of the scientific movement. 
The character evidence rule runs counter to a second aspect of the 
underlying scientific principles that helped to form the rule: discovery builds 
bridges to further discovery.  In the past fifty years, much has been discovered 
about psychology and behavioral traits which pertain to batterers.305  The 
character evidence rule bars the use of this evidence in the domestic violence 
context, preventing the jury from benefiting from these scientific 
advancements. 
It is important to recognize that the rejection of the character evidence rule 
in the domestic violence context does not equate with a return to a focus on 
character.  The defendant’s prior acts of domestic violence are not character, 
they are context. Consistent with modern conceptions of battering 
relationships, the prior acts are simply part of the pattern, not isolated 
incidents.  The jury will have to assess the entire pattern, not simply the 
isolated charged incident.  The function of the jury will still be the assessment 
of objective actions.  The focus of the trial remains on the objective actions of 
the defendant, not on whether the defendant is a good person or a bad person.  
Jurors have the ability to determine objective actions even when confronted 
with evidence of prior misconduct.  As has been discussed, juries have 
historically been presented with evidence of the domestic violence victim’s 
 
 305. See Susan Marlene Davies, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: A Reassessment of 
Relevancy, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 504, 533 (1991). 
“[T]he view that character evidence in general is not probative of conduct can no longer 
draw support from the psychology materials.  Where the prior behavior or a character trait 
is described with sufficient particularity and where it occurred in an analogous context, it 
may be highly probative of the conduct in question.  At the same time, the psychological 
literature does not indicate that character evidence is unduly prejudicial.  Although misuse 
of character evidence admitted for limited purposes is probably inevitable, the notion that 
jurors overvalue the probativeness of character or make errors because of their inability to 
make accurate assessments of character gains little reinforcement from contemporary 
work in the social sciences.” 
Id. 
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“character.”  The addition of admission of prior acts of the defendant may add 
to the jury’s task but not substantially alter it. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The legal system should be wary of changes to established principles that 
have stood the test of time.  The character evidence rule has existed for 
centuries, and the general purpose of the rule remains valid.  A call to alter the 
character evidence rule should be cautiously and carefully considered. 
In general, the character evidence rule promotes neutral dispute resolution, 
encourages greater egalitarianism, rejects the importance of social status, and 
fosters adherence to scientific principles.  In the domestic violence context, 
however, the rule fails to achieve these aspirations.  Rather, the rule violates 
important aspects of its intellectual foundation: liberalism, the Enlightenment, 
and the scientific movement.  In the domestic violence context, the character 
evidence rule subjugates women, promotes societal stereotypes of women, 
perpetuates domestic violence against women, and sanctions that same 
violence.  Until the character evidence rule is changed in domestic violence 
prosecutions, the law will continue to tacitly condone domestic violence. 
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